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INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty-five years, the law of “bad faith” has grown
from infancy as a compensable action in contract law into a major
1
source of tort litigation. During this relatively short gestation period,
at least in comparison to other legal actions, this new body of tort,
grounded in an implied contractual or fiduciary duty not to act in

1. See Mark J. Browne, Ellen S. Pryor & Bob Puelz, The Effect of Bad Faith Laws on
First-Party Insurance Claims Decisions, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 355, 355 (2004) (discussing the
emergence of an “extracontractual cause of action against insurers for bad-faith
denial of a claim filed by an insured for benefits allegedly due to the insured under
the policy”); see also Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Williams, 936 So. 2d 888, 895
(Miss. 2006) (“A bad faith insurance claim represents one of the most familiar types
of punitive damages claims known to our case law.”); Fight Bad-faith Insurance
Companies (FBIC), http://www.badfaithinsurance.org/ (last visited July 27, 2009)
(reporting that there are “many hundreds of thousands to a million or more” badfaith claimants).
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bad faith in any dealing, or conversely to act in good faith, has
3
shifted the balance of power in many transactions. As intended,
plaintiffs’ ability to bring a separate tort action has helped to curb
4
abuse and unfair practices. Unfortunately, as quickly as bad-faith law
developed to come to the aid of the disadvantaged party in a contract
or fiduciary relationship, it has evolved into a litigation quandary that
often misses its basic purpose. With every state adopting statutes to
5
govern certain types of bad-faith actions, litigation of such claims has
gone beyond simply righting wrongs to become a big business of its
own. In some cases, enterprising plaintiffs’ attorneys seek out
technical violations to bring a bad-faith action where there is no
6
purposeful or malevolent will, or even a remotely unfair act.
In legitimizing such claims, bad-faith law has lost its way. Today the
law may actually facilitate bad faith in the very manner in which these
laws were meant to combat it.
Principal among laws governing bad faith are those related to
insurance practices, which are the subject of this Article. In response
to alleged insurer abuses, states have, in some form, attempted to
7
legislate “bad faith” in the handling of insurance claims practices.
Yet, in attempting to define the amorphous concepts of bad faith and
unfair practices, many states have opened the door to claims that do
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) (“Every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and
its enforcement.”).
3. See Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.E.2d 616, 619 (S.C. 1983)
(arguing that without the availability of such tort claims, insurance companies would
be able to arbitrarily deny claims without the threat of regulatory enforcement).
4. See infra notes 19–24 and accompanying text (describing potentially harmful
practices insurers were able to engage in due to the limited and proscribed remedies
available to claimants prior to statutory and judicial reforms).
5. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-156.5 (LexisNexis 2005) (bad-faith cause of action
for initiating drug-related claim); ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.390 (2008) (bad-faith cause of
action relating to workers’ compensation claim); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-17-161 (2004)
(bad-faith cause of action against consumers making motor vehicle warranty claims);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-430 (2008) (bad-faith cause of action for misreporting child
abuse); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-33-215 (2006) (bad-faith cause of action for seizing or
failing to return property in forfeiture); see also, e.g., statutes cited infra note 47.
6. The California Supreme Court, a pioneer in bad-faith jurisprudence, see infra
Part II.A, was among the first to recognize this growing problem: “It seems . . . that
attorneys who handle policy claims against insurance companies are no longer
interested in collecting on those claims, but spend their wits and energies trying to
maneuver the insurers into committing acts which the insureds can later trot out as
evidence of bad faith.” White v. W. Title Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 309, 328 n.2 (Cal. 1985)
(Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Neil A. Goldberg et al., Can the Puzzle Be
Solved: Are Punitive Damages Awardable in New York for First-Party Bad Faith?,
44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 723, 723 n.1 (1993) (predicting bad faith insurance law “will
significantly impact the insurance industry in the 1990s”).
7. See infra note 47 and accompanying text (illustrating the widespread
adoption of statutes addressing insurers’ unfair claims settlement practices).
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not appropriately fit in tort law, but rather should be left to
traditional contract remedies or state regulatory enforcement.
The result is that insurers in some states are at risk of being deprived
of their ability to challenge a reasonably disputed insurance claim.
Further, they may be unable to make a swift correction of human
error without facing the prospect of a tort claim, including punitive
8
or exemplary damages. These damages can toll in the millions of
9
dollars for a single claimant’s recovery. Such tort claims are also
increasing in frequency and amount at a time when the regulation of
insurer practices is at its most comprehensive, leading to an
incongruity where instead of heightened penalties and regulations
operating to reduce the incidence of bad-faith claims, more claims
10
have been encouraged. Without reasonable boundaries in bad-faith
actions, courts may permit claimants to engage in abusive practices
against insurers. This establishes an avenue for windfall recoveries
for some claimants and offsets the insurance industry’s delicate
tension between providing recovery and protecting against fraud and
overpayment—each a cost which is internalized and ultimately borne
by consumers.
This issue takes on added urgency now that many states are again
examining the adoption of bad-faith causes of action against insurers.
For example, in the past two years, Colorado, Maryland, Minnesota,
and Washington have each significantly amended their bad-faith
11
laws. A number of other states have also considered legislatively

8. See infra Part II.A.4 (recommending that courts recognize a “right to cure”
and prohibit the awarding of extra-contractual damages for bad-faith lawsuits in
order to reduce insurers’ incentives to cover up or contest minor technical errors).
9. See, e.g., Goddard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 179 P.3d 645 (Or. 2008) (affirming a
$20 million punitive damage award for bad-faith insurer practice); see also, e.g., $20
Million Allstate Ruling, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 2006, § 2, at 2 ($18 million punitive
damages verdict against insurer); David Harper, Lawyer: Suits Not About Big Money,
TULSA WORLD, Jan. 7, 2007, at A18 ($10 million punitive damages verdict against
insurer for bad-faith handling of claim); Dan Margolies, A Look At What’s Behind
Area’s Big Jury Awards, KAN. CITY STAR, Jan. 16, 2007, at D11 ($10.5 million punitive
damage award against insurer in first-party bad-faith case).
10. See Clausen v. Nat’l Garage Mut. Ins. Co., 730 A.2d 133, 140 (Del. Super. Ct.
1997) (“Actions seeking recovery for bad faith under first-party medical, disability,
casualty, and life policies are a relatively recent development and an increasingly
common cause of action.”); see also Alan O. Sykes, Bad Faith Breach of Contract By FirstParty Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 406 (1996) (explaining the recent rise in badfaith insurance actions and the increase in their remedies); supra note 1 and
accompanying text (emphasizing the rapid increase in bad-faith insurance claims).
11. See H.B. 1407, 2008 Leg., 66th Sess. (Colo. 2008) (codified at COLO. REV.
STAT. § 10-3-1115 to -1116 (2008)); S.B. 389, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007)
(codified at MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 27-1001 (2007)); S.B. 2822, 2008 Leg., 85th Sess.
(Minn. 2008) (codified at MINN. STAT. § 604.18 (2008)); S.B. 5726, 2007 Leg.,
60th Sess. (Wash. 2007) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.015 (2007)).
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expanding their bad-faith laws. While arguments can be made that
such amendments are not necessary, and that the adaptability of the
common law is sufficient to protect insureds, the fact remains that
bad-faith statutes are a reality in our legal system. As this Article
demonstrates, often times these statutes and the related common law
are more than sufficient, to the point of being detrimental to the
fundamental goal of guaranteeing that insurers do not take
advantage of their insureds.
It is in this vein that this Article proposes to balance the scale by
providing principles for the reasonable construction of bad-faith and
unfair claims settlement practices in statutes applicable to
13
insurance. Part I examines the history and development of bad-faith
law, and discusses the common structure of statutes giving rise to badfaith settlement claims. Part II presents general principles courts may
apply to resolve an action alleging bad faith, and specific principles
courts may apply to address common issues with many states’ statutes.
Part III then evaluates the public policy involved in applying such
principles to first-party claims where the insured suffers an injury and
seeks compensation directly from the insurance company, or, where
they are permitted, third-party claims where the insured harms a
person not party to the insurance contract and the harmed person
makes a claim against the insured who is then defended by the
14
insurer.
This Article concludes that the public interest is most effectively
and efficiently served by applying more responsible construction of
bad-faith laws and by returning to the foundational precepts behind
these laws. It further reasons that while there is, no doubt, a
substantial public interest in ensuring that insurers “play nicely” and
act in good faith, this interest should not always be enforced through
litigation and should never supersede basic fairness and justice.
12. In 2009, state jurisdictions introduced the following bad-faith bills: S.B. 103,
2009 Leg., 67th Sess. (Colo. 2009); S.B. 763, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2009);
S. 962, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2009); H.B. 450, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009);
S.B. 1137, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2009); L.D. 1305, 2009 Leg., 124th Sess. (Me.
2009); H.B. 345, 2009 Leg., 61st Sess. (Mont. 2009); S.B. 157, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(N.M. 2009); A.B. 224, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2009); S. 132, 2008–09 Leg., 213th
Sess. (N.J. 2008); A. 3698, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); H.B. 2791, 2009 Leg.,
Reg. Sess., 75th Sess. (Or. 2009); S.B. 746, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009); H. 5196,
2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2009); B. 18-103, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (D.C. 2009).
13. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance:
Maintaining Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 561–82
(2006) (developing reasonable construction principles in the law of public
nuisance).
14. This Article does not differentiate between first-party and third-party tort
liability, but rather uses the general term “claimant” to refer to whoever is lawfully
permitted to bring a claim.
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Finally, this Article suggests that courts apply the principles discussed
where a statute does not clearly and unambiguously express a
contrary interpretation or where doing so would subvert the public’s
interest in safeguarding consumers from oppressive insurer acts.
I.

LANDSCAPE OF BAD-FAITH CLAIMS

A. History and Development of Bad Faith
The history of the law pertaining to bad faith is deeply entwined
with the practice of insurance. Nearly a century ago, the New York
15
Court of Appeals in Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co. first recognized
an implied contractual duty of “good faith and fair dealing” in every
16
insurance agreement. Over a half century later, the Supreme Court
of California held that “bad” insurer acts provide a basis to look
beyond the traditional contract measure of damages and create
17
common law tort liability. Today, this liability is often determined
by statute and insurance practices continue to dominate the litigation
18
landscape.
Before courts recognized tort liability for bad faith, and before
states began to comprehensively regulate insurance practices,
19
insurers had greater latitude to act. In some instances, insurers, or
perhaps more appropriately, their employees or agents, took
advantage of an insured’s lack of remedies to limit, delay, or even
20
deny recovery. The primary remedy for claims made against an
insurer during this period was determined by the common law rule of
21
Hadley v. Baxendale, which limited damages to the terms of a

15. 104 N.E. 622 (N.Y. 1914).
16. Id. at 624; see also Hilker v. W. Auto. Ins. Co., 231 N.W. 257, 261 (Wis. 1930),
aff’d on reh’g, 235 N.W. 413, 414 (Wis. 1931) (relying on Brassil and noting that the
term “bad faith” is one of variable significance and broad application).
17. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (noting that attorneys handling
insurance policy claims often seek out bad faith to heighten available recoveries).
18. See supra note 1 (acknowledging the emergence of bad-faith claims against
insurance companies).
19. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 7.7 (1988)
(explaining that before the emergence of bad-faith laws, insurers were generally not
penalized for purposeful delay in paying a claim or a failure to pay); Roger
Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions: Refining the
Standard of Culpability and Reformulating the Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 1, 11–12 (1992) (describing insurers’ freedom from liability for legal fees or
penalties before the enactment of statutes that protected consumers from unjustified
refusals to pay claims).
20. See, e.g., Ins. Co. v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. 378, 386 (1872) (limiting damages to the
insurance policy agreement plus interest).
21. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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22

contract. Outside of the contract, recovery against an insurer was
primarily limited to a fraud action, which required a showing that the
insurer never intended to perform the agreement, or an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, which did not always
cover economic damages and was not uniformly available across state
23
jurisdictions. Some states also provided a statutory action to recover
attorneys’ fees and sometimes penalties or interest for unnecessary
24
delays in payment. However, the practical difficulties of proving
fraud, the non-uniform availability of other remedies, and the lack of
well-developed regulatory oversight or significant penalties for
insurer violations disadvantaged claimants who challenged a specific
insurer’s actions.
Beginning in the 1950s, courts first began to impose an extracontractual duty to settle so-called “third-party” claims that arose
25
when the insured was sued for wrongfully harming another person.
This duty covered situations where an “insurer had rejected a
settlement offer within the policy limits and the insured thereafter
26
incurred liability in excess of those limits,” thus leaving the insured
with the obligation to fund the excess amount owed to the third party
out-of-pocket. The Supreme Court of California in Comunale v.
27
Traders & General Insurance Co. became the first court of last resort
to hold the insurer, and not the insured, liable for such excess
damages as a breach of the insurer’s implied covenant of good faith
28
and fair dealing. As the court explained, “An insurer who denies
22. See id. at 151 (limiting damages to those contingencies within the mutual
contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract).
23. See STEPHEN ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 2.11, at
2-32, 2-33 (2d ed. 1997); see also H. Walter Croskey, Bad Faith in California: Its History,
Development and Current Status, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 561, 561–63 (1991) (tracing the
development of tort remedies for bad-faith insurance claims in California); Marc S.
Mayerson, “First Party” Insurance Bad Faith Claims: Mooring Procedure to Substance,
38 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 861, 864 (2003) (discussing the elements of fraud and
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims that make such claims difficult or
undesirable to bring).
24. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 12 n.39 (listing various state statutes enacted
at the turn of the century that allowed for recovery of attorneys’ fees and penalties);
see also id. at 13 (indicating that while some states adopted statutes to allow recovery
for attorneys’ fees, the majority of states did not adopt similar legislation).
25. Browne et al., supra note 1, at 360–81; Dominick C. Capozzola, First-Party Bad
Faith: The Search for a Uniform Standard of Culpability, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 181, 185–86
(2000) (discussing the emergence in Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co.,
328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958), of a duty to settle claims in excess of policy limits).
26. Sykes, supra note 10, at 406.
27. 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
28. See id. at 201 (“When there is great risk of a recovery beyond the policy limits
so that the most reasonable manner of disposing of the claim is a settlement . . . [the
insurer’s] unwarranted refusal to do so constitutes a breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.”).
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coverage does so at its own risk, and, although its position may not
have been entirely groundless, if the denial is found to be wrongful it
29
is liable for the full amount which will compensate the insured . . . .”
In 1973, fifteen years after Comunale, the Supreme Court of
California once again engineered the development of the law of bad
30
faith in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co. by extending tort liability to
so-called “first party” claims where an insured sues his or her insurer
31
under a liability coverage agreement. The court in Gruenberg built
32
on third-party jurisprudence and a line of California appellate court
33
rulings that supported first-party tort liability, ultimately reasoning
34
that “[t]hese are merely two different aspects of the same duty.”
In that case, the “bad faith” was also readily apparent. The insurer
“willfully and maliciously” engaged in a scheme to deprive an insured
of benefits from a fire insurance policy by encouraging criminal
charges by falsely implying that the insured had a motive to commit
35
arson. The insured was unable to appear for an examination while
the criminal charges were pending, and the insurer intended to use
36
the insured’s failure to appear as a pretense for denying liability.

29. Id. at 202.
30. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
31. See id. at 1037 (holding that an insurer may be liable in tort for failing to
compensate insured).
32. See, e.g., Comunale, 328 P.2d at 201 (distinguishing insurance companies’ duty
to compensate third parties (which is limited to the policy amount) from insurance
companies’ duty to insureds (first parties) for insurance company breach of
contract); see also, e.g., Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 178 (Cal. 1967) (affirming
judgment of emotional damages for third-party plaintiff against insurer).
33. The California Court of Appeal case, Wetherbee v. United Insurance Co., 71 Cal.
Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1968), aff’d 95 Cal. Rptr. 678 (Ct. App. 1971), appears to be the
first to permit extra-contractual damages in the first-party insurance context. See id.
at 767 (insured under disability policy awarded $500,000 punitive damages and
$1,050 compensatory damages relating to claim for $150 in monthly benefits).
Two years later, the Court of Appeal affirmed after remittitur, punitive and
compensatory damages for an insurer’s intentional infliction of emotional distress
resulting from the insurer’s wrongful refusal to pay the insured’s disability claim, and
stated that independent of that tort, the threatened and actual bad faith acts
constituted a “tortious interference to a protected property interest.” Fletcher v.
Western Nat’l Life Ins. Corp., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App. 1970). In 1972, the court
similarly relied upon this theory to justify a punitive damage award in an uninsured
motorist case. See Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 102 Cal. Rptr. 547
(Ct. App. 1972), overruled on other grounds by Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1042 n.10; see also
Kelly H. Thompson, Comment, Bad Faith: Limiting Insurers’ Extra-Contractual Liability
in Texas, 41 SW. L.J. 719, 719 (1987) (“California pioneered the development of
insurers’ extra-contractual liability . . . .”).
34. Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1037.
35. See id. at 1038 (noting that the plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired
to encourage criminal charges against the plaintiff by wrongly implying that the
plaintiff had a motive to commit arson).
36. Id. at 1038.
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Following the Comunale and Gruenberg decisions, courts in other
states applied similar reasoning to recognize tort liability for bad faith
37
Because these seminal
in both first-party and third-party claims.
decisions involved different types of “bad” acts—a manifestly unfair
act in Comunale and an intentional act in Gruenberg—and because the
court in Gruenberg did not expressly state that intent was required,
courts struggled with the degree of culpability needed to maintain
38
this newly established tort. In 1978, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
39
in Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co. provided a more definitive
and widely-accepted standard that there must be “an absence of a
reasonable basis for denial of policy benefits and the knowledge or
40
reckless disregard of a reasonable basis for a denial.” The court
further explained that “the tort of bad faith is not a tortious breach of
contract. It is a separate intentional wrong, which results from a
breach of duty imposed as a consequence of the relationship
41
established by contract.” The court also recognized that the absence
of an intent element would allow claimants to “scar[e] insurers into
42
paying questionable claims because of the threat of a bad faith suit.”
As the common law basis for the tort of bad faith solidified and, in
the case of first-party claims, was adopted by a majority of states in the
37. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1156 n.6
(Alaska 1989) (allowing an action in tort for breach of good faith and fair dealing in
insurance contracts due to the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds);
Chavers v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d 1, 6 (Ala. 1981) (refusing to allow
insurers to deny claims in bad faith, where insurers know “that the avowed purpose
of the insurance contract [i]s to protect the insured at his weakest and most perilous
time of need”). A number of states that expressly rejected a common law cause of
action for bad faith in first-party claims permit third-party actions. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Fed. Kemper Ins. Co., 536 A.2d 1211, 1212–13 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Duncan
v. Andrew County Mut. Ins. Co., 665 S.W.2d 13, 18–19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Lawton
v. Great Sw. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 581 (N.H. 1978); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
701 P.2d 795, 799 (Utah 1985).
38. The Gruenberg decision did not explicitly state that a willful or malicious act
was necessary to maintain a first-party bad-faith claim in tort. Rather, the court only
required an unreasonable act. See Jason C. Brown, Extra-Contractual Damages Stemming
from a First-Party Insurer’s Bad Faith Breach: Will Minnesota Adopt the Tort or Contract
Theory of Recovery?, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 525, 534 (2000) (noting a consensus by
scholars that Gruenburg’s holding is vague and gives little guidance).
39. 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).
40. Id. at 377 (emphasis in original); cf. Arnold v. Nat’l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (articulating the same reasonable basis and actual
knowledge standard). But see Lee Shidlofsky, The Changing Face of First-Party Bad Faith
Claims in Texas, 50 SMU L. REV. 867, 872 (1997) (discussing the weaknesses of the test
announced in Arnold).
41. Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 374; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Simpson,
477 So. 2d 242, 250 (Miss. 1985) (stressing that a bad-faith refusal claim is an
“independent tort”).
42. Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 377 (quoting John W. Thornton & Milton S. Blaut,
Bad Faith and Insurers: Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 12 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC.
L.J. 699, 719 (1977)).
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43

1970s and 1980s, many states also moved towards statutory
44
State legislatures often set out to protect against
codification.
insurer bad faith by enumerating unfair practices or, at least, by
providing plaintiffs with a statutory bad-faith comparison when
45
initiating a common law action.
The law of bad faith began to
46
follow an unsteady and precarious path during this period.
Although the state legislatures enacted statutes in an attempt to instill
greater definition and support to bad-faith law, some statutes have
blunted the willfulness, maliciousness, or manifest injustice that
provided the foundation of this new tort action in the first place.
The idea of inherent unfairness of specific acts has been lost in
certain instances and, instead, has been replaced with nebulous
elements that have been manipulated to enhance outcomes.

43. State supreme court decisions expanding bad-faith tort actions to first-party
claimants during this period include: Chavers v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So.
2d 1 (Ala. 1981); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152 (Alaska
1989); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d 463 (Ark. 1984);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985); Buckman v. People Express,
Inc., 530 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1987); White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014
(Idaho 1986); Dolan v. Aid Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1988); Curry v. Fireman’s
Fund Ins. Co., 784 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1989); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Simpson, 477
So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1985); Lipinski v. Title Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 970 (Mont. 1982);
Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769 (Neb. 1991); United Fire Ins. Co. v.
McClelland, 780 P.2d 193 (Nev. 1989); State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 527 P.2d
798 (N.M. 1974); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279
N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1979); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315 (Ohio
1983); Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977); Bibeault v.
Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1980); Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
306 S.E.2d 616 (S.C. 1983); Champion v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 399 N.W.2d 320 (S.D.
1987); Arnold v. Nat’l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987); and
Anderson v. Cont. Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978). States continued to
recognize first-party bad-faith suits into the 1990s. See Tackett v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254 (Del. 1995); Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 920
P.2d 334 (Haw. 1996); Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman, 622 N.E.2d 515 (Ind. 1993); Marquis
v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d 644 (Me. 1993); McCullough v. Golden Rule
Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1990). See generally Browne et al., supra note 1, at 355;
Capozzola, supra note 25, at 182; Goldberg et al., supra note 6, at 727; A.S. Klein,
Annotation, Insurer’s Liability for Consequential or Punitive Damages for Wrongful Delay or
Refusal to Make Payments Due Under Contracts, 47 A.L.R.3d 314 (1992).
44. See Mayerson, supra note 22, at 863 n.6 (2003) (discussing state level, nonjudicially promulgated standards and rules for insurance company conduct).
45. See infra notes 120–121 (exploring the influence of statutes in adjudication
and on the common law).
46. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 32 (arguing that while “the new tort remedy
[is] necessary in some form, [it] now shows signs of being too oppressive on an
industry whose financial vitality and efficiency are essential to social well-being”).
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B. Bad-Faith Statutes
Today, statutes addressing bad-faith and unfair insurance claims
47
settlement practices exist, in some form, in every state. These laws
are largely a product of model legislation drafted by the National
48
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in the early 1970s.
The NAIC’s model legislation covered unfair methods of competition
49
and general deceptive practices in the insurance business.

47. See ALA. CODE § 27-12-24 (LexisNexis 2007); ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.125 (2008);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-461 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-66-206 (2001); CAL. INS.
CODE § 790.03(h) (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104(1)(h), 10-3-1115
to -1116 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38A-816(6) (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 2304(16) (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 624.155(1) (West 2004), 626.9541(1)(i) (West
2009), 766.1185 (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-34 (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 431:13-103(a) (LexisNexis 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1329 (2003); 215 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/154.6, 5/155 (West 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-4-1-4.5
(LexisNexis 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 507B.4(9) (West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-2404(9) (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-230 (2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22:1220, 22:1973 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 2164-D, 2436-A (2000);
MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 27-303 to -305, 27-1001 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
93A, § 9, ch. 176D, § 3 (LexisNexis 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 500.2026
(LexisNexis 2008); MINN. STAT. § 72A.20(12), 72A.201, 604.18; MO. REV. STAT.
§ 375.1007 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-18-201, 33-18-242 (2007); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-1540 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 686A.310 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 417:4(XV) (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-13.1 (West 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 59A-16-20 (LexisNexis 2000); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2601 (McKinney Supp. 2009); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 58-63-15(11), 75-1.1 to -16 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-04-03(9)
(2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.21(P) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 36, § 1250.4–.5 (West 1999 & Supp. 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.230 (2007);
40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1171.5(a)(10) (1999); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371 (West 2007);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-1-33 (1997), 27-9.1-4 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-59-20 (2002);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33-67 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109, 56-7-105, 56-8104(8) (2008); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.003 (Vernon 2009); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31A-26-303 (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4724(9) (2) (2005); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.2-510 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.30.015 (Supp. 2009); WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 284-30-330 (2009); W. VA. CODE R. ANN. §§ 33-11-4(9), 33-11-4a (2006); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 26-13-124 (2007). Mississippi and Wisconsin do not appear to have
statutes specific to insurance bad-faith or unfair claims settlement practices, but do
generally prohibit unfair or deceptive insurance practices and set forth time periods
in which claims must be paid. See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 83-5-33, -45, 83-9-5 (1999 &
Supp. 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 424.501, 628.46 (West 2004 & 2005). But see
Kontowicz v. Am. Standard Ins. Co., 714 N.W.2d 105, 115 (Wis. 2006) (stating that
the statute relating to the timely payment of insurance claims was unrelated to the
tort action of bad faith).
48. NAIC originally promulgated the Model Unfair Trade Practices Act
(MUTPA) in the 1950s with provisions for the regulation of insurer unfair trade
practices, and all states had adopted it by 1959. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19,
§ 8.1, at 932–34; Henderson, supra note 19, at 14. However, the original model act
mainly dealt with the marketing practices of insurers. New model legislation dealing
with unfair claims settlement practices was developed and incorporated into the
MUTPA by amendment in 1972. Proceedings of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners 495 (1972) [hereinafter Proceedings].
49. Proceedings, supra note 49, at 495–96.
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In tailoring statutes specific to claims settlement practices, a majority
50
of states have adopted this legislation with only minor changes.
The core provisions of such statutes are general and justifiably
broad in scope. For example, there is a near uniform provision that
requires insurers to communicate “reasonably promptly” with respect
to claims, and the requirement to adopt and implement “reasonable
51
standards” for claims investigation.
This requirement is often
supplemented by an obligation to affirm or deny a claim within a
52
These statutes typically contain a prohibition
“reasonable time.”
against refusing to pay claims without a “reasonable investigation,”
and the essential duty to negotiate “in good faith to effectuate
prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has
53
become reasonably clear.”
Many statutes also contain provisions
prohibiting insurers from “[c]ompelling insureds to institute
litigation . . . by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
54
recovered” when an insured makes a claim.
In essence, these general provisions cover insurer actions that are
unreasonable, but not necessarily intentional. They are included
among more specific prohibited acts that imply an element of intent.
For example, most unfair claims settlement statutes also prohibit
insurers from: attempting to settle claims where the insurer altered a
claims application without notice or consent of the insured; making
payments to insureds or beneficiaries without stating the coverage
under which the payments were being made; delaying investigation
or payment of a claim by requiring submission of preliminary claims

50. The states adopting NAIC’s model legislation near wholesale include: Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
See, e.g., Knotts v. Zurich Ins. Co., 197 S.W.3d 512, 528 (Ky. 2006) (stating that
Kentucky’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act was enacted almost verbatim from
the NAIC model act and that the act has been adopted in varying forms in all fifty
states and U.S. territories). Other states have adopted nearly identical language for
less substantial portions of their unfair claims settlement statutes. These states
include Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah.
See, e.g., Lewis v. Equity Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183 (Miss. 1994) (stating that
Mississippi’s unfair claims settlement act was based from model NAIC legislation
drafted in 1976).
51. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1329 (2003) (adopting the model legislation
without significant modification or additional claims settlement provisions).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.; see also infra Part II.B.4 (arguing that claims settlement statutes that
compare the insurer’s final settlement offer to the amount recovered represent
unsound policy).
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reports with duplicative information; and intimidating claimants by
making them aware of an insurer’s policy of appealing any arbitration
55
award favorable to the insured.
Despite the commonality in structure and language of most of the
unfair claims settlement practices state statutes, judicial
interpretation of these laws varies significantly. The combination of
unreasonable insurer acts and intentional acts within the statutes
provides some explanation for divergent interpretations. Because
these statutes are largely based on model legislation that predates the
prevailing common law developments with respect to the degree of
56
culpability necessary to maintain an action, the statutes fail to clearly
identify bad-faith settlement practices as an intentional tortious act.
Thus, less culpable conduct, including that of mere negligence, may
trigger a statutory bad-faith violation even where it would be
57
inappropriate under the state’s common law. Such amorphous and
inconsistent treatment has encouraged allegations of bad faith in
insurance litigation, even in cases where the insurer and the insured
simply disagree, or for other non-negligent conduct.
Inconsistent state interpretations also exist as to the manner of
enforcement—specifically, whether private or public actors should
enforce bad-faith statutes. Some states have codified the common law
bad-faith cause of action expressly and thereby allow private
58
enforcement, while other states expressly retain exclusive oversight

55. See statutes cited supra note 47.
56. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text (tracing the development of the
level of culpability required in a bad faith tort claim).
57. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1113 (2008) (stating a negligence
standard for first-party claims against an insurer), with Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706
P.2d 1258, 1272 (Colo. 1985) (articulating a two-element standard for insurer
conduct: “unreasonable conduct, and knowledge that the conduct is unreasonable
or a reckless disregard for the fact that the conduct is unreasonable”).
58. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1113 (2008) (explaining that an insurer
has breached its duty of good faith if it has unreasonably delayed or denied payment,
and providing guidelines for civil actions based on such a breach); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 624.155(1) (West 2004) (allowing any person damaged to bring a civil action
against an insurer); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-4-7 (West 2000) (permitting a claimant to
initiate a civil action based on bad faith only after the claimant has attempted to
settle with the insurer); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1220 (2008) (listing several specific
acts that constitute a breach of the insurer’s duty of good faith when knowingly
committed); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8371 (West 2007) (explaining the various
remedies available under a private bad-faith cause of action against an insurer);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-33 (2005) (allowing a claimant to recover compensatory and
punitive damages, as well as attorneys’ fees, against an insurer that refuses to pay or
settle a claim in bad faith); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.30.015 (2007) (requiring an
unreasonable denial of benefits by an insurer before a claimant may bring a private
action); see also Goldberg et al., supra note 6, at 731 (noting that many of these
statutes serve as the legislatures’ response to a state judicial branch not recognizing a
common law claim against insurers for bad faith).
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and enforcement through the state insurance commissioner.
In some states, the judiciary has also created an implied private right
60
of action on the basis of a bad-faith statute. Other state courts have
taken the opposite approach and have held that bad-faith statutes
61
preempt private enforcement. Even where a private statutory right
59. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-461(19)(D) (West Supp. 2004) (noting
that although the unfair claims settlement practices statute provides a right to an
administrative remedy, it does not provide any private right of action for insureds);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2164-D(8) (2000) (noting that the state’s unfair
claims practices section may not be construed to provide a private cause of action);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33-69 (2005) (barring private actions under the state’s
unfair or deceptive insurance practices laws); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-8-101 (2008)
(granting the state insurance commissioner sole enforcement authority for, and
barring any private right of action under, the Tennessee Unfair Trade Practices and
Unfair Claims Settlement Act); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-26-303 (2005) (listing what
acts constitute unfair claims settlement practices, but explicitly barring a private
cause of action based on such acts).
60. See Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 643 A.2d 1282, 1286 (Conn. 1994) (implying a
private right of action for violation of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act in cases
where the insurer’s action rises to the level of a general business practice); Curry v.
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 784 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Ky. 1989) (implying a right of action
for first-party claimants based, in part, on a public policy argument for the
advantages of permitting recovery when an insurer acts in bad faith); State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 117–18 (Ky. 1988) (reasoning that a
third-party private right of action was permissible, because the insurer had clearly
violated the Unfair Claims Settlement Practice Act and the Act did not specifically
prohibit such a claim); Dodd v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 365 N.E.2d 802, 805
(Mass. 1977) (holding that the legislature’s failure to specifically provide for a private
right of action under the state consumer protection act does not demonstrate an
intent to prohibit such a claim), superseded by statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9(1)
(2002), as recognized in Hershenow v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 840 N.E.2d 526, 532
(Mass. 2006); Indus. Indem. Co. of N.W. v. Kallevig, 792 P.2d 520, 530 (Wash. 1990)
(finding that the plain language of the Washington State Consumer Protection Act
supported an insured’s private bad-faith cause of action against an insurer). In Royal
Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329, 332 (Cal. 1979), the California
Supreme Court was the first to hold that a private cause of action existed for a
violation under its version of the model NAIC legislation, but reversed itself almost a
decade later.
See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 68
(Cal. 1988) (arguing that the Royal Globe decision was based primarily on public
policy, and that resolutions based on competing policy issues are more properly
addressed by the legislature). West Virginia also initially implied a private right of
action in Jenkins v. J. C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co., 280 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1981),
but later enacted legislation superseding the decision. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-114a (LexisNexis 2006) (abrogating a private cause of action relating to bad-faith
settlements of insurance claims). Conversely, in Montana, an implied right of action
was superseded by a statute that allowed private enforcement. See Klaudt v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 658 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Mont. 1983) (finding that the
statutory language on its face clearly protected third-party claims), superseded by
statute, Unfair Trade Practices Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-242 (2007), as recognized
in O’Fallon v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 859 P.2d 1008, 1014–15 (Mont. 1993) (noting that
the new law was more permissive because, to allow for a private right of action, it did
not require violations of the code to be so frequent as to rise to a general business
practice).
61. See Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 158 (Kan. 1980)
(finding that the legislature provided multiple detailed alternative remedies,
including those related to bad faith on the part of insurer, for a wronged insured);
Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 581 (N.H. 1978) (noting that the
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of action is recognized, a number of state courts have found that this
action is only available to those insured and not other third-party
62
claimants. Further, in those states where no private statutory right
of action exists, some courts have nevertheless found that unfair
claims settlement statutes were useful proxies for identifying
instances of bad faith in private actions brought under the common
63
law.
In addition to state-by-state differences as to who may bring a
statutory bad-faith action against an insurer, there is significant
variation in what a successful plaintiff may recover. Some claims
settlement statutes specifically provide for attorneys’ fees or they set
64
forth damage ranges for each violation of the statute. For example,
Oklahoma imposes a fine, enforced by the state Insurance
Commissioner, between $100 and $5,000 for each violation of its

legislature established alternative mechanisms to handle insurer malfeasance);
D’Ambrosio v. Penn. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 966, 970 (Pa. 1981)
(reasoning that allowing a private cause of action in addition to the enforcement
mechanisms available to the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner would require
the court to improperly delve into policy issues), superseded by statute, 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 8371 (2007); cf. Farris v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015, 1020
(Or. 1978) (explaining that although the need for private enforcement based on bad
faith might arise in extraordinary circumstances, traditional contract remedies are
almost always adequate for insurance cases).
62. See, e.g., Bates v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 467 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Iowa 1991)
(arguing that the adversarial nature of the relationship between the insurer and a
third-party claimant, unlike the fiduciary relationship between an insurer and the
insured does not provide a basis for a good-faith duty to settle a claim); Dvorak v.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 508 N.W.2d 329, 331 (N.D. 1993) (explaining that an
insurer’s duty to settle in good-faith extends only to insureds, because, unlike third
parties, insureds are direct beneficiaries of the insurer’s actions); Kallevig, 792 P.2d at
528–30 (holding that the statutory language provides a private right of action for
first-party claimants only); Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 307 N.W.2d 256,
265 (Wis. 1981) (arguing that a bad-faith tort claim, while distinct from a breach of
contract claim, still arises from the insurance contract and therefore only extends to
the insured).
63. See, e.g., Wailua Assocs. v. Aetna Cos. & Sur. Co., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1221
(D. Haw. 1998) (stating that although no private right of action exists under Hawaii’s
unfair claims settlement statute, it may nevertheless be used as evidence of insurer
bad faith in a common law action); see also Kontowicz v. Am. Standards, Inc.,
714 N.W.2d 105, 114–15 (Wis. 2006) (supporting an unfair claims settlement, in part,
with broad statutory principles from case law on bad-faith tort claims).
64. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.155(4) (West 2004) (allowing a successful
plaintiff to recover damages, court costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees); GA. CODE
ANN. § 33-4-6 (2000) (granting the insured limited damages in addition to attorneys’
fees and court costs); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/155 (West 1993 & Supp. 2009)
(capping the damages available to the insured at sixty percent of the damages, sixty
thousands dollars, and/or the excess of the determined damages, not including
costs, minus any settlement offered by the insurer); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A,
§ 2436-A(1) (allowing a recovery scheme similar to that in Florida, but also providing
a monthly interest rate of 1.5 percent on damages).

1492

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1477

65

statute, while Nebraska imposes a penalty up to $30,000 for each
66
and every violation. A number of states also allow punitive damages
67
for private claimants. Massachusetts’s bad-faith statute, for instance,
expressly permits punitive damages up to twenty-five percent of the
68
underlying bad-faith claim.
In comparison, Louisiana uses a
65. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1250.14 (West 1994) (exempting the State
Insurance Fund).
66. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1543 (2004) (capping the total penalty, however, at
$150,000).
67. See, e.g., Craft v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 572 F.2d 565, 574 (7th Cir. 1978)
(permitting punitive damages in insurance bad-faith claims based on a public
interest in preventing insurance companies from abusing their insureds); Trimper v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 540 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 (D. S.C. 1982) (arguing that not
allowing punitive damages for bad-faith tort actions would allow insurance
companies to operate with impunity); Rodgers v. Penn. Life Ins. Co., 539 F. Supp.
879, 884 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (explaining that a prima facie case for the recovery of
punitive damages requires the insured to allege that the insurer acted recklessly and
maliciously in denying benefits); German v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 501 F. Supp. 51, 53
(N.D. Ill. 1980) (noting that the law does not favor punitive damages); Escambia
Treating Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367, 1370–71 (N.D. Fla. 1976)
(cautioning that punitive damages are only justified when the defendant is guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice); Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95
(Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (rejecting arguments that punitive damages are improper and
impermissible compensation for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Grand
Sheet Metal Prods. Co. v. Prot. Mut. Ins. Co., 375 A.2d 428, 430 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1977) (adopting the Gruenberg rule which states that insurers have a good faith duty
to fairly handle claims made by insurers, and that a violation of this duty gives rise to
an action in tort); Casson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 361, 368 (Del. Super. Ct.
1982) (recognizing a developing trend allowing for recovery of punitive damages
against insurers for breach of contract rising to the level of willful, wanton,
fraudulent, or malicious conduct); Penn. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunlap, 264 S.E.2d
483, 485–86 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (explaining that punitive damages should be
affirmed unless there was a reasonable legal defense discharging the insurer from its
duty of good faith); Linscott v. Rainier Nat’l Life Ins. Co. 606 P.2d 958, 964 (Idaho
1980) (holding that, to receive punitive damages, a plaintiff must show that the
insurer’s handling of the claim deviated from reasonable standards of conduct with
an awareness of the consequences of that deviation); Sacton v. Meridian Mut. Ins.
Co., 337 N.E.2d 527, 532 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (concluding that punitive damages are
appropriate when an insurer heedlessly disregards the consequences of its actions
and acts fraudulently or oppressively); First Sec. Bank v. Goddard, 593 P.2d 1040,
1049 (Mont. 1979) (allowing an insured to recover punitive damages based on actual
or presumed fraud or malice); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire
Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638, 646 (N.D. 1979) (noting that California and North Dakota
statutes require that the insured show that “the insurer acted ‘with the intent to vex,
injure or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights’” in order to
recover punitive damages (quoting Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1110
(Cal. 1974)); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1322 (Ohio 1983)
(arguing that mere inaction on behalf of the insurer is not enough to allow an
insured to recover punitive damages); Christian v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d
899, 903 (Okla. 1977); Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313, 319 (R.I. 1980);
Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.E.2d 616, 620 (S.C. 1983)
(explaining that with the recognition of the bad-faith cause of action as a tort,
punitive damages may be allowable).
68. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176D, § 7 (2002) (allowing, in addition, nonmonetary damages, such as revocation of license for repeat offenders); see also MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9 (2002) (allowing punitive damages for a bad-faith action
between two and three times the actual damages).
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multiplier and allows exemplary damages up to two times any
69
compensatory recovery.
States that recently amended their bad-faith statutes have also
significantly heightened available extra-contractual damages.
For example, since 2007, Maryland has increased penalties up to
70
$125,000 per insurer violation, Colorado has authorized aggregate
71
penalties up to $750,000, and Washington has enacted a treble
72
damages multiplier for first-party insurance bad-faith claims.
A final differentiating quality in many claims settlement statutes is
the inclusion of additional prohibited acts that are not part of the
model NAIC legislation. These provisions often include rigid criteria,
such as specific time limits within which an insurer must process a
claim, and provide a basis for much of the bad-faith litigation
involving less culpable insurers. For example, states like Missouri,
Nebraska, and Illinois have statutes prescribing a strict fifteen-day
window in which the insurer must provide claims forms or violate the
73
state’s unfair claims settlement act. In Rhode Island, that period is
74
ten days. Some states also set strict deadlines for other practices,

69. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1973(C) (2008) (adding that insurers are not
permitted to use any punitive damages for setting rates or market-rate filings).
70. See S.B. 389, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007) (codified at MD. CODE ANN. INS.
§ 27-1001 (2007)) (authorizing the state commissioner to impose consequential
damages under the bad-faith statute).
71. See H.B. 1407, 2008 Leg., 66th Sess. (Colo. 2008) (codified at COLO. REV.
STAT. § 10-3-1115 to -1116 (2008)) (providing that the $750,000 cap is the annual
limit for aggregate penalties, and further limiting the penalty for a single violation to
$3,000).
72. See S.B. 5726, 2007 Leg., 60th Sess. (Wash. 2007) (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE § 48.30.015 (2007)) (noting that the insured may apply other claims against
the insurer based on unfair or deceptive practices, which are not subject to the bill’s
limits).
73. See 215 ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5/154.6(o) (West 2003) (listing various acts
which, if committed knowingly, will constitute improper claims practice); MO. REV.
STAT. § 375.1007(13) (2002) (requiring further that the insurer include reasonable
instructions for the forms’ use); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1540(14) (2004) (standing
alone as the only provision in the section with a specific time limit despite an overall
focus on promptness).
74. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-9.1-4(13) (2008).
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75

such as when an insurer must respond to a claim or even when a
76
claim must be settled.
Differences in identification of bad-faith conduct, enforcement
mechanisms, and remedies create a wide range of treatment for bad
faith in the handling of insurance claims. Although most states’
statutes appear similar, and sometimes nearly identical in form, their
interpretation by courts and the presence of additional provisions or
remedies creates close to fifty unique landscapes. It is against this
backdrop that courts would benefit from a more reasoned set of
principles to apply in addressing bad-faith insurance claims.
II. APPLYING THE RULE OF REASON FOR
JUST CONSTRUCTION OF BAD-FAITH LAWS
In delineating principles to assist courts with bad-faith insurance
claims, we begin with the most basic inquiry: What is bad faith?
Courts and legal scholars have long struggled to form an acceptable
77
answer to this question. The difficulty of reaching a satisfactory
definition stems in part from the fact that good faith and bad faith
78
have only recently been independently recognized in tort law.
In many respects, bad-faith law is still in its formative years. Rather
than attempt to precisely define bad faith, many states, at common
law, adopt a “you know it when you see it” approach and leave it for a

75. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9541(1)(i)(3)(e) (West 2004) (requiring an
insurer to affirm or deny claims, or communicate that claims are being investigated
upon an insured’s written request within thirty days after completing proof of loss
statements); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1250.4(C) (1994) (providing that an insurer must
respond to all pertinent written communications from the insured within thirty days
after receipt); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-9.1-4(16) (2008) (allowing the insurer to take
longer with the consent of the insured); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33-67(1) (2005)
(instructing the insurer to adopt standards to promote prompt investigation of
claims in addition to the thirty-day response to a claim requirement).
76. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-816(15)(B) (2007) (requiring an insurer to
settle claims within forty-five days); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-16-20(F) (West 2008)
(characterizing the failure to settle “catastrophic claims” within ninety days as a
prohibited unfair claims practice); W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9)(o) (2006) (requiring
claims to be settled within a ninety-day period).
77. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 34 (“The term ‘bad faith’ . . . is not selfdefining, nor has it historically been a recognized, independent basis of culpability in
tort law. It has come to mean different things to different courts. Consequently, its
use has caused definitional problems from the outset.”); see also King v. Second Nat’l
Bank & Trust of Saginaw, Mich., 173 So. 498, 500 (Ala. 1937) (“Bad faith is not to be
inferred from facts equally consistent with good faith.”); Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas.
Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 151 (Kan. 1980) (describing, critically, the trend towards
recognition of the independent tort of bad faith as an attempt to provide a remedy
for every wrong).
78. See supra Part II.A (highlighting the development of the independent tort of
bad faith and concluding that attempts to statutorily define bad faith have only
muddled its meaning).
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79

jury to filter out what bad faith really means. Because this practice
can lead to inconsistent results, states have moved to codify bad faith
through laws such as insurance claims settlement statutes, and, in
doing so, have re-encountered the same difficulties and
inconsistencies that initially prompted courts to resist more rigid
80
definitions for this highly amorphous concept. The effect of this
dual statutory and common law development is that the law of bad
faith is now more muddled than ever. To help wade through this
disorder and provide rational boundaries for bad faith, this Article
proposes a set of general principles applicable to all types of bad-faith
insurance claims along with a set of principles applicable to common
issues arising under claims settlement statutes.
A. General Principles Applicable to Bad-Faith Claims
1.

“Bad Faith” should include a minimum element of intentional or reckless
misconduct
The law of bad faith originated in order to combat the “bad acts” of
81
insurers. It was first recognized to prevent insurers from refusing to
settle a claim or properly defend an insured against third parties and
instead roll the dice at the insured’s expense in hopes of being found
82
liable for less than the insured’s policy limit. The tort was later
recognized in a case involving acts tantamount to fraud where an
insurer “willfully and maliciously” schemed to deny coverage to the
83
insured. These origins, whether or not formally expressed at the
84
time, were aimed at countering specific and purposeful insurer acts.
They invoked a sense of dishonesty and malice on the part of an
79. See ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 151 (2d ed. 1996)
(explaining that good faith and bad faith have “no universally accepted definition”
and, therefore, the trier of fact has “considerable flexibility” in adjudicating cases
involving potential mishandling of insurance claims).
80. See Capozzola, supra note 25, at 182–83 (explaining that attempts to provide a
remedy for bad faith have led to insurer culpability standards that vary widely from
state to state).
81. See supra Part I.A (describing how insurers historically could sometimes take
advantage of the fact that insureds were only permitted to recover up to the amount
of their policy).
82. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text (explaining that the initial
reasoning behind allowing third-party claims was that the insured should not suffer
as a result of the insurer’s unreasonable actions).
83. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text (discussing Gruenberg v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973), which involved an insurer that encouraged
criminal charges against the insured in order to deny liability).
84. See Leland C. Smith, II, Tort Liability for an Insurer’s Bad Faith Refusal to Settle:
A Developing Trend Appropriate for Adoption in Missouri, 45 MO. L. REV. 103, 106–08
(1980) (discussing the development of bad-faith tort action in California to prevent
an insurer from blatantly disregarding the best interest of the insured).
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insurer; sentiments with which other courts could empathize and
85
quickly justify an entirely new addition to their common law.
A majority of jurisdictions now agree that bad faith requires an
86
element of intent or reckless disregard; however, this must be
clarified. These courts have largely aligned with the Wisconsin
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Anderson v. Continental Insurance
87
Co., which established a more measured approach that considers the
88
Other courts, like the
interests of both claimants and insurers.
Supreme Court of California, have disagreed with this view, holding
89
that mere negligence satisfies bad faith. In states like Mississippi
90
and New Mexico, the bad-faith standard is gross negligence.
Until significant legislative reforms in 2005, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals had taken the most maverick approach,
finding it “of little importance whether an insurer contests an
insured’s claim in good or bad faith,” and holding that insurers could
85. See Capozzola, supra note 25, at 188 (explaining that the most common
argument for the availability of a bad-faith tort action is based on the fear that an
insurer would otherwise act with impunity and deny claims when it benefits from
doing so).
86. See James A. McGuire & Kristin Dodge McMahon, Issues for Excess Insurer
Counsel in Bad Faith and Excess Liability Cases, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 337, 339 (1995)
(stating that a majority of jurisdictions require more than negligence, but less than
the standard for fraud, to maintain a bad-faith cause of action).
87. 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).
88. See id. at 378 (holding that a plaintiff may recover for emotional distress
caused by an insurer’s bad faith refusal to pay a claim when the emotional distress is
severe and the plaintiff has also suffered other substantial damages); Roger C.
Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions After Two Decades,
37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1153, 1158–59 (1995) (noting that in 1995 at least ten of thirty
jurisdictions followed the Wisconsin test, while others have taken the test a step
further by requiring “gross negligence”); see also Capozzola, supra note 25, at 203–05
(proposing a bifurcated standard of negligence for actual damages, and an
intentional or reckless disregard standard for punitive damages); McGuire &
McMahon, supra note 86, at 339 (discussing how the Michigan judiciary identified
factors—e.g., failing to inform the insured of developments, rejecting a reasonable
offer of settlement, and disregarding legal advice—to aid in determining whether an
insurer has acted in bad faith).
89. See Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., 426 P.2d 173, 173 (Cal. 1967)
(discussing the tort of bad-faith in the context of tort claims generally, and
explaining that damages are appropriate when a plaintiff is injured as a result of a
defendant’s negligent conduct). But see Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Prod. Sales &
Mrkt., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (signaling a possible trend of
courts moving away from the mere negligence standard by requiring that bad faith
“rise to the level of unfair dealing”).
90. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Day, 487 So. 2d 830, 832 (Miss. 1986) (holding
that in order for an insured to receive damages above the amount of the policy, he
or she must prove gross negligence on the part of the insurer); Jessen v. Nat’l Excess
Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 1244, 1247 (N.M. 1989) (stating that based on a theory of either
contract or tort, punitive damages are justified when an insurer acts with gross
negligence); see also Henderson, supra note 88, at 1158 n.44 (explaining that gross
negligence is a somewhat ambiguous term, but is generally considered more
outrageous than ordinary negligence).
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be held liable for consequential damages even for reasonable claim
91
denials.
By recognizing bad faith in the absence of an intentional act by the
insurer, courts risk severely undermining the substance of this law.
They expand the scope and boundaries of bad faith to encompass
well-intentioned actions by insurers and they muddy the law’s goal of
92
giving notice of the type of conduct that will result in liability. If bad
faith comes to mean everything, then it will soon mean nothing.
Therefore, to give any substantive meaning to a cause of action for
bad faith, and to separate it from ordinary actions based in
93
negligence, an element of intent must be present. The concept of
“negligence” can work well in measuring conduct that may threaten a
physical harm such as negligent driving; however, it does not work
well as a measure of conduct when an insurer, acting on a contract,
makes a good-faith decision not to settle a case.
Courts such as the Arkansas Supreme Court have given meaningful
substance to bad faith, reasoning that an insurer must have acted in a
“dishonest, malicious, or oppressive” manner in delaying or denying
94
an insured’s claim. In an attempt to maintain the integrity of badfaith actions, the Supreme Court of Alabama imposed a “directed
verdict” rule that requires the policyholder to be entitled to a
directed verdict on its coverage claim in order for the insurance
91. Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 352 S.E.2d 73, 79 (W. Va. 1986).
West Virginia’s reform legislation, in part, abolished third-party insurance bad-faith
claims, which is estimated to have saved the state’s residents over $80 million since its
enactment. See S.B. 418, 2005 Leg. (W. Va. 2005) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 33-11-4a (LexisNexis 2008)) (noting the bill’s aim is to establish prerequisites to
filing third-party bad-faith claims); see also Jake Stump, Officials Say Ban on Bad Faith
Suits Benefits Consumers, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Feb. 7, 2008, at 2A (noting the new
system in place requires third parties to handle claims through the State
Commissioner). In addition to eliminating third-party claims, the 2005 amendments
to the state’s bad-faith laws imposed an intentional tort standard for certain penalties
issued by the state insurance regulators. See W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-11-4a, 33-11-6
(LexisNexis 2006) (omitting a requirement that the insurer’s action must rise to a
general business practice if the insurer intentionally acts in bad faith).
92. See supra notes 79–80 (discussing how the current law’s ambiguity makes the
law easy to mold and, therefore, difficult to predict); see also BMW of N. Am. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our
constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty
that a State may impose.”).
93. See Chavers v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d 1, 6 (Ala. 1981)
(reasoning that the policy considerations that preclude a negligence standard are
not applicable when the cause of action arises out of intentional misconduct by the
insurer).
94. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d 463, 465
(Ark. 1984); see also Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 905 (Okla.
1977) (stating that tort liability is only appropriate where it is clear that the insurer
acted unreasonably in avoiding liability under the insured’s claim).
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company’s denial of coverage to constitute bad faith as a matter of
95
law. As a result, the law of bad faith in these states has proven to be
96
consistent and predictable, and has provided proper notice to
insurers about what conduct will subject them to liability.
The same rationale applies equally to bad-faith statutes.
Historically, these statutes present a mix of intentional and
97
unreasonable acts brought under the umbrella of bad faith.
However, where private enforcement is authorized under these
statutes, there exists the need for an intentional or reckless act, not a
human error or simple miscommunication, as a basis to justify
damages beyond the insurance contract. Some states, such as
Minnesota, have recently codified an intentional tort standard for
98
bad faith through amendments to bad-faith laws.
This is
counterbalanced by other states’ recent changes to bad-faith statutes,
such as those in Colorado and Washington, which lower the bar to a
99
simple negligence standard.
By lowering the conduct standard for bad faith, states implicitly
encourage less meritorious claims and permit the allegation of bad
faith as standard practice in almost any insurance dispute. Actions
such as clerical errors or even a computer malfunction or virus could
result in substantial extra-contractual damages where there is no

95. See Nat’l Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 419 So. 2d 1357, 1362 (Ala. 1982)
(noting that although the burden on the plaintiff is high, if an issue of material fact
exists, the bad-faith tort claim must fail); see also Pickett v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445,
453–54 (N.J. 1993) (allowing bad-faith tort claims only when a valid justification for
the insurer’s denial could not possibly exist). But see Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co., 799
A.2d 997, 1005 (R.I. 2002) (“It makes little sense that an insurance company may . . .
be insulated from tort liability for its bad-faith conduct because it fortuitously survives
a motion for judgment as a matter of law, yet is ultimately found to have breached
the insurance contract.”); Marc S. Mayerson, “First Party” Insurance Bad Faith Claims:
Mooring Procedure to Substance, 38 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 861, 870–71 (2003)
(criticizing as illogical the basis of the rule because if an insurer had a reasonable
justification for denying the claim, it could not have acted in bad faith).
96. There are less than a hundred reported appellate decisions involving badfaith insurance claims settlement practices in Alabama and Arkansas in the past ten
years.
97. See supra notes 51–61 and accompanying text (discussing the differences
among states in the core elements of bad-faith statutes).
98. See S.F. 2822, 2008 Leg., 85th Sess. (Minn. 2008) (codified at MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 604.18 (West 2000)) (allowing a court to award “taxable costs” if an insured
proves that an insurer denied a claim with a knowing or reckless disregard and
without a reasonable basis).
99. See H.B. 1407, 2008 Leg., 66th Sess. (Colo. 2008) (codified at COLO. REV.
STAT. § 10-3-1115 (2008)) (implementing a reasonableness standard); S.B. 5726,
2007 Leg., 60th Sess. (Wash. 2007) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.015
(Supp. 2009)) (noting that the insured may apply other claims against the insurer
based on unfair or deceptive practices, which are not subject to the bill’s limits).
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evidence of misconduct.
As a basic public policy issue, this is
unwise and more likely to deny justice. Again, the concept of extracontractual damages represents a relatively new and significant
departure in remedies; it follows that an award of such damages
should be supported by something more than an act of carelessness
101
or misjudgment.
2. Litigation of bad-faith claims should not intrude upon or duplicate the
role of state regulators
Under the present system in many states, bad-faith enforcement
102
may occur both through private laws and government enforcement.
A claimant may bring a cause of action at common law or pursuant to
a bad-faith claims settlement statute, and the state insurance
department may initiate a separate action. As a result of this dual
enforcement, the insurer may be liable twice for the same or similar
conduct. While proponents of such regimes may argue that this
merely provides additional incentive for insurers to stay above board
in all of their dealings, the notion of double punishment for the same
act runs contrary to fundamental fairness within the civil justice
103
system.
In effect, a single insurer action may trigger several avenues for
damages. An insurer may be forced to pay full contract damages
(i.e., the policy limit), extra-contractual damages, which may also
include punitive damages (which may itself be a multiplier of the
total compensatory award), and stiff penalties from the state
insurance department. As previously indicated, punitive damage
awards alone may be millions of dollars, and state penalties, which
likewise serve a punitive function, can reach hundreds of thousands

100. See Employee Mut. Cas. Co. v. Tompkins, 490 So. 2d 897, 898, 909 (Miss.
1986) (affirming punitive damages in the amount of $400,000 arising out of a badfaith claim against an insurance company, which denied a claim based on a claims
adjustor’s misunderstanding despite the fact that the insurance company, upon
learning of its mistake, immediately offered the correct compensation).
101. Unintentional errors more appropriately fall within the oversight of state
insurance regulators who may fine insurers that fail to correct repeated errors.
See infra Part II.A.4 (analyzing situations where an insurance company was found to
have acted reasonably, although it was in error, and arguing that in such
circumstances compensatory, not punitive damages, are the proper remedy).
102. See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text (discussing the inconsistencies
among state statutes relating to bad-faith torts).
103. Cf. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448–49 (1989) (holding that civil
penalties following a criminal conviction for the same act can violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause); Dep’t of Prof. & Occupational Reg. v. Abateco Serv., Inc., 534
S.E.2d 352, 357 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that multiple civil fines for the same act
are unconstitutional under a “gross disproportionality” standard).
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of dollars.
These damages are in addition to an insurer’s internal
cost of compliance, so as to avoid future bad-faith litigation, and in
some states, payment of the claimant’s attorneys’ fees and court
105
costs.
Taken together, the insurer may be dealt a heavy blow on
multiple levels for a single improper act.
Consider a scenario where a court does not require that bad faith
include an element of intent. An insurer disputes a claim, reasonably
from its perspective, but due to a clerical error in data-entry, fails to
meet a statute’s window of time for providing the proper claims
106
forms. Although the insurer did not intend to act in bad faith, it is
now in violation of a bad-faith statute and may be punished by being
ordered to pay the reasonably disputed claim in full, subjected to
extra-contractual damages, fined thousands of dollars by the state,
and forced to reengineer its claims processing system. Imagine
further that this is an average-to-large-sized insurer with $2 billion in
net premiums earned and a staff of hundreds who handle
approximately 540,000 claims a year, or roughly 1,500 claims per
107
day. Even with a well-trained staff, human errors such as the one in
this hypothetical cannot be completely eliminated when such large
numbers are involved. Dual-enforcement by private and public actors
makes this practically unavoidable scenario unjustifiable because it
permits what amounts to multiple forms of punishment for the same
108
act.
A balanced solution requires a more defined structure of
enforcement. Unintentional acts, which are nevertheless deemed
unreasonable and inappropriately characterized as bad faith, should
104. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-29-6 (2005) (establishing a damages range of
$5,000 to $25,000 for each insurer violation up to $250,000); see also supra note 9 and
accompanying text (highlighting several cases in which punitive damages amounted
to tens of millions of dollars).
105. See supra notes 24, 64 (examining a variety of damages, created by state
statutes, that may be awarded for an insurer’s bad-faith acts).
106. See statutes cited infra notes 181–84 and accompanying text (listing statutory
time limits for filing a claim).
107. See generally BEST’S AGGREGATES & AVERAGES: PROPERTY CASUALTY U.S. &
CANADA (2008). According to an analysis of A.M. Best data, an insurer with $2 billion
in premium dollars (net premiums earned) handled an estimated annual average of
approximately 540,000 claims from 2001–2007, or roughly 1,500 claims per day.
These figures are based on data showing net premiums earned and claims reported
across eight major lines of property casualty insurance. Annual premiums of $2
billion rank an insurer roughly 40th countrywide in highest total premiums and
represent the average premium total of the top 250 insurers countrywide, which have
ninety-five percent of U.S. market share.
108. In this example, paying full contract damages on a reasonably disputed claim
which the insurer would have otherwise prevailed upon can be viewed as an
additional form of punishment from the extra-contractual damages action and the
state regulatory penalty.
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fall within the sole jurisdiction of state regulatory authority. After all,
state insurance departments are charged with regulating insurance
practices, and they develop comprehensive regulations to that end.
They are in the best position to impose a commensurate fine to
discourage on a state-wide basis acts that amount to simple error,
without disrupting or skewing the true merits of the underlying
109
insurance claim.
Further, the claimant may individually recover
110
damages caused by the delay under traditional contract theory.
By way of contrast, where the insurer engages in a purposeful and
malicious act to deny coverage under a particular claim, the less
exacting instrument of private tort litigation enables harsher
punishment. Courts should, therefore, refrain from permitting
private bad-faith actions that may unfairly yield multiple recoveries
where the basis of the action encroaches upon the very purpose and
function of state regulatory authority.
3. Courts should not imply a private right of action or use a claims
settlement statute as a common law proxy unless expressly authorized by
the state legislature
While courts endeavor to iron out many differences within the law
of bad faith and attain some semblance of uniformity among states,
they should not, as a basic constitutional law principle, imply private
111
As a
rights of action for violations of insurance claims statutes.
corollary, courts should also reject the use of claims settlement
statutes as a proxy for what constitutes bad faith in a common law
action because of the law’s inconsistent treatment and because of the
historical context in which legislatures drafted these statutes.
During the 1970s, as states began to embrace the common law
expansion of a tort action for bad faith and legislatures quickly
112
moved to enumerate bad-faith conduct, the specifics of the law

109. See Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d. 576, 581 (N.H. 1978)
(explaining the various benefits of the state insurance department bad-faith
guidelines, including for instance, a policy that allows every fire insurance claimant
the right to an independent appraiser of a claim, thereby preventing bad-faith action
on the part of the insurer before the claim may be denied or delayed).
110. See id. (finding that contract remedies eliminate the need for a private cause
of action).
111. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761,
765 (2008) (arguing that the doctrine of separation of powers requires that courts
only imply a cause of action “if the underlying statute can be interpreted to disclose
the intent to create one”); cf. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 164, 190–91 (1994) (discussing the “far-reaching consequences” of implying
a cause of action under the Securities and Exchange Act).
112. See supra Part I (examining the motivations behind early bad-faith statutes
and jurisprudence).
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remained unsettled. Courts generally recognized the importance of
leveling the playing field in certain transactions, such as insurance,
but concentrated their decisions on justifying the adoption of this
new addition to the common law, a weighty proposition for any court,
113
rather than analyzing its nuances.
It is in this context that states
enacted bad-faith statutes, incorporating the model NAIC
114
legislation.
These laws attempted to identify bad faith before the
case law had adequately developed and defined “bad faith” (other
than to acknowledge its existence). The statutes were also often
115
silent as to who had standing to sue.
Indeed, many states at the
time were still determining whether the common law action applied
116
As case law
to first-party claimants, third-party claimants, or both.
developed and courts began tackling these issues, the results varied
117
widely across states.
The expediency in which states, anxious to combat the bad acts of
insurers, adopted wholesale NAIC’s model legislation, while
presumably well-intentioned, has been a cause of the inconsistencies
faced by both insurers and claimants today. These laws not only
diluted the substance of bad faith by reducing culpability to a
negligence standard—an action that was subsequently rejected in the
common law of a majority of states—but also exacerbated
inconsistencies in standing by failing to clearly address enforcement
118
of the statute.
Moreover, because these statutes amount to a
premature exploration of the law of bad faith, they should be treated
as such by courts, which can and should minimize the impact of the
statutes while still enforcing the law. Courts should not, therefore,

113. See supra Part I.B (arguing that the many discrepancies in interpretations of
state laws addressing bad-faith tort claims may be attributed to the court’s failure to
take into account the nuances of the statutes).
114. See supra notes 48–50 (discussing the adoption of the NAIC Model Act in
1972 and listing the many states that adopted this Act nearly wholesale).
115. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text (discussing the courts’ struggle
to determine whether or not to allow first-party and third-party suits in insurance
bad-faith tort claims).
116. See supra note 43 (discussing the expansion of standing in bad-faith tort
claims during the 1970s and 1980s).
117. See supra Part II.B (arguing that one major point of diversion among states is
the level of culpability required before punitive damages are awarded to the insured,
and criticizing those states that allow punitive damages to be awarded in cases of
mere negligence on the part of the insurer).
118. See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 67–68 (Cal. 1988)
(discussing the questions left unanswered by California’s introduction of a private
action for bad-faith claims against insurers, including failing to explain what may be
considered a “bad faith” action, who has standing, and the amount of damages
available).
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imply a private right of action under an unfair claims settlement
119
statute unless the legislature has expressly stated its intent to do so.
The use of a claims settlement statute as a proxy for a common law
action for bad faith represents an issue of greater practical
significance. It is an established practice for courts to look to a
closely related statute when determining the scope or applicability of
120
the common law. Former Harvard Law School Dean James Landis,
almost eighty years ago, articulated this “gravitational pull” effect in
which a legislature’s statutory policy guides the development of the
121
common law.
Courts today often use insurance claims settlement
122
While this exercise may prove valid and
statutes in this capacity.
insightful to courts in some instances, the law of bad faith presents
the rare set of circumstances where this practice is inappropriate
because the common law reflects a more contemporary view than the
statutes reflect. The common law of a majority of states has since
rejected liability for the unintentional acts committed by insurers,
contrary to the provisions of virtually all of the states’ unfair
insurance claims settlement acts. The courts’ use of such antiquated
laws as a proxy to guide the common law, therefore, ignores and
undermines the development of the law of bad faith.
4. Where an insurer’s wrongful act is the result of a mistake or unintentional
error, a right to cure without penalty should be permitted
A key step in restoring a sense of balance to the law of bad faith is
to curb the flow of bad-faith claims that have improperly fueled
119. See infra Part III.B.1 (arguing that such a policy promotes fairness and has
constitutional value).
120. See DeMaria v. DeMaria, 724 A.2d 1088, 1091 (Conn. 1999) (noting that
“statutes are a useful source of policy for common-law adjudication, particularly
when there is a close relationship between the statutory and common-law subject
matters”); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1
(1982) (arguing that the United States legal system has shifted from being
dominated by common law to being dominated by statutes); Ellen Ash Peters,
Common Law Judging in a Statutory World: An Address, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 995, 998
(1982) (arguing that the role of statutes in the development of common law has
evolved from being narrowly construed to avoid “derogation of the common law” to
playing a central role—being taken “into account virtually all of the time”). Courts
now commonly use statutes to guide policy and provide “consistent common law
development.” Id.
121. See James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL
ESSAYS 213–14, 233 (R. Pound ed., 1934) (arguing that much of the common law
actually originated in statutory legislation, and concluding that the “cavalier
treatment of legislation” at the time was “certain to be a passing phenomenon”);
see also Frank M. Coffin, Review: The Problem of Obsolete Statutes: A New Role for Courts?,
91 YALE L.J. 827, 832 (1982) (discussing the connection between Guido Calabresi’s
scholarly works on statutes and common law and those of James Landis).
122. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (describing how courts inferred
private rights of action from statutes that may not explicitly grant them).
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national litigation by focusing on minor technical infractions. These
claims may nevertheless trigger a state’s bad-faith claims settlement
statute or be used as a proxy in a common law action. For the most
part, such claims involve instances where an insurer missed strict
123
deadlines for “reasonable” claims-processing, where an insurer
unintentionally failed to communicate certain information to the
124
insured or another party,
or where an insurer’s employee
125
committed other human errors. These claims are often brought by
enterprising plaintiffs’ attorneys who seek out violations in hope of
reaching a quick or greater settlement than may otherwise be
126
warranted.
Where such claims appear, and where it is clear that
they are the result of a simple mistake, misunderstanding, or human
error that the insurer is readily willing to correct, courts should
recognize a “right to cure” and preclude a bad-faith lawsuit to recover
extra-contractual damages. Such an approach would properly focus
the law on the tort law goal of promoting good behavior. It would
also not violate the tort law goal of promoting just compensation,
because the corrective action by the insurer abates economic loss
which may have been endured by the claimant.
As stated throughout this Article, the central concept underlying
the law of bad faith is to discourage bad acts which should equate,
and do in most jurisdictions, to purposeful or reckless acts.
The remedy of damages beyond the contract serves an essentially
127
punitive and deterrent function against future bad acts.
Mistakes
and human error, and the insurers’ willingness to correct those
mistakes, comport with neither justification. Mistakes take place
123. See, e.g., Porcelli v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., Inc., No. 2:07-cv-613-FtM-29DNF,
2008 WL 2776725, at *5–6 (M.D. Fla. July 15, 2008) (allowing a bad-faith action to
proceed where the insurer did not meet the statute’s thirty-day deadline to provide
policy information); see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing reasonableness standards).
124. See, e.g., Kissoondath v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 620 N.W.2d 909, 916
(Minn. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Short v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384 (Minn.
1983)) (proposing that evidence of a failure to communicate a settlement offer to
the insured supports a finding of bad faith by the insurer); Romano v. Nationwide
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 646 A.2d 1228, 1232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (stating that bad-faith
conduct includes failure to communicate with a claimant).
125. See, e.g., Town & Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 472 N.E.2d 1265, 1269
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that the insurer’s statement of coverage and the
discovery of the insured’s death two weeks after the accident were “attributable to
mere human error” and reversing the trial court’s punitive damages award).
126. See supra note 6 (noting that attorneys handling claims against insurance
companies seem to be more interested in finding evidence of bad faith than actually
collecting on the claims).
127. See O’Neill v. Gallant Ins. Co., 769 N.E.2d 100, 111 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
(reasoning that “punitive damages can provide some degree of deterrent against
unscrupulous insurers who would otherwise take advantage of customers and abuse
their fiduciary relationship in order to promote their own economic self-interest”).
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regardless of whether a remedy is limited to the contract or some
128
Furthermore, the remedy
measure of extra-contractual recovery.
for such human error is already provided for in every state through
129
regulatory enforcement and contract law.
State insurance
regulators are empowered to fine insurers for each and every mistake
that results in a technical violation of the law, and where human
130
errors are repeated to a level exceeding societal tolerances.
Regulatory authorities can also require improved practices for
131
insurers and levy additional harsh penalties for noncompliance.
These penalties apply regardless of private enforcement. If any
economic losses remain after the insurer has taken action to correct
its mistake, contract damages can provide for the direct economic
losses incurred. A bad-faith lawsuit seeking additional recovery for
mistakes and unintended errors only serves as a windfall to plaintiffs
and their attorneys.
Permitting tort recovery for minor technical errors, in addition to
lacking a rational justification, has other negative consequences.
First, a successful private lawsuit has the practical effect of taking the
place of state insurance regulation because it alters the insurers’
actions, but such de facto regulation is not subject to the public
accountability of regulation by a state agency. Second, allowing a
private action in these instances may encourage an insurer’s bad faith
by unjustly altering the litigation dynamic. If an insurer commits an
unintended error and is confronted with a bad-faith lawsuit,
including the potential for punitive or exemplary damages, the
insurer may be compelled to inappropriately challenge the claim that
132
it made a mistake.
Further, if a claimant’s settlement offer is
unreasonably high, perhaps due to the superior bargaining position
the claimant finds himself or herself in where a mistake has occurred,
128. See Victor Schwartz & Christopher Appel, Effective Communication of Warnings
in the Workplace: Avoiding Injuries in Working with Industrial Materials, 73 MO. L. REV. 1,
14–15 (2008) (discussing the cognitive limits of employees in the workplace).
129. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the roles and distinctions between regulators
and litigators); see also Choharis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 A.2d 1080, 1088–
90 (D.C. 2008) (rejecting tort liability against insurers and identifying other available
remedies for insureds).
130. Statutes often refer to such repeated errors as acts committed “with such
frequency as to indicate a general business practice.” See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-461 (2008); MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 27-304 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-13.1
(2009).
131. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 19, at 12 n.39 (listing various state statutes
enacted at the turn of the century that allowed for recovery of attorneys’ fees and
penalties).
132. Settlement typically provides a reasonable alternative, but if a plaintiff is
unwilling to settle in hopes that a jury will award exemplary damages, litigation
becomes the only recourse for the insurer.
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the insurer may be compelled to litigate a claim based on a mistake in
the hopes of paying only nominal damages. In either event,
dishonesty and cover-up are encouraged, which in addition to
subverting justice, reduces efficiency and circumvents a state’s
133
regulatory authority.
A right to cure a mistake or human error alleviates these system
strains while providing greater efficiency and fairness. If permitted to
remedy the error without incurring additional penalties, insurers
might be more likely to admit their mistakes, many of which might
otherwise go undiscovered. Hence, a right to cure could improve
transparency and honesty in insurance claims-handling.
A statutory right to cure is currently available in a minority of
states. Florida, for example, permits a right to cure “if, within 60 days
after filing notice, the damages are paid or the circumstances giving
134
rise to the violation are corrected.” Similarly, West Virginia allows
insurers a right to cure within 60 days of receiving notice of an action
135
from the state’s insurance commissioner.
This notion of a right to cure also exists in many other legal
incarnations such as sellers’ rights under the Uniform Commercial
136
137
Code, a homeowner’s right of redemption, and various other
138
Similar to a buyer receiving a nonconsumer transactions.
conforming product under a sales contract and the seller being able
to redress the issue, the insurer should be able to rectify an
unsatisfactory handling of claims under an insurance contract.
The principle of encouraging “cure” is common in other areas of law
as well. For example, rules of evidence preclude the admission of
subsequent remedial measures to improve the safety of a product or
139
service when it is offered as proof of an admission of fault.
By allowing a right to cure and by precluding a bad-faith lawsuit
where the insurer makes a clear effort to correct its mistake, courts
133. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing how private bad-faith actions may
unnecessarily mirror state regulatory actions).
134. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.155(3)(d) (2009); see also Talat Enter., Inc. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 753 So. 2d 1278, 1284 (Fla. 2000) (recognizing the legislature’s
intent to provide insurers a sixty-day window as a final resort to comply with their
contractual obligations).
135. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-11-4a(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2008).
136. U.C.C. § 2-508 (2003).
137. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-302 (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2414 (2008);
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 209.011 (2007).
138. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 537.5110 (2009) (consumer right to cure credit debts);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-51-3 (2008) (right to cure automobile payment deficiency prior to
repossession); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (2006) (plan to cure defaults during
bankruptcy).
139. FED. R. EVID. 407.
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and legislatures could greatly improve the landscape of bad-faith
claims; they could improve the efficiency and transparency of claimshandling and promote fairness to both sides of insurance
transactions.
5. Courts should recognize a limited action for reverse bad faith against
insurers
Until now, bad-faith law has been almost exclusively a one-way
140
street. Claimants may maintain a tort cause of action under statute
or common law against the insurer for a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but insurers in those same
jurisdictions are extended no reciprocal right of action for claimants’
141
wrongful acts.
The justifications for this facial inequity are not
entirely clear or persuasive other than that there is virtually no case
142
law to support a “reverse bad-faith” claim.
Yet, as one may recall,
this situation is strikingly reminiscent of the landscape of bad-faith
143
law only decades ago.
At the time, it was clear one side had an
140. See Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 610 P.2d 1038,
1041 (Cal. 1980) (stating that the “duty of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance
policy is a two-way street, running from the insured to his insurer as well as vice
versa,” but holding that no reciprocal right applies); Douglas R. Richmond,
The Two-way Street of Insurance Good Faith: Under Construction, But Not Yet Open, 28 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 95, 140 (1996) (arguing in favor of a reverse bad-faith right of action).
141. See William S. Anderson, Placing a Check on an Insured’s Bad Faith Conduct:
The Defense of “Comparative Bad Faith,” 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 528–31 (1994)
(observing court decisions that have rejected reverse bad-faith claims); John F.
Dobbyn, Is Good Faith in Insurance Contracts a Two-Way Street?, 62 N.D. L. REV. 355,
357–67 (1986) (examining a brief history of bad-faith claims); Cathryn M. Little,
Fighting Fire with Fire: “Reverse Bad Faith” in First-Party Litigation Involving Arson and
Insurance
Fraud,
19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 43, 44-46 (1996) (noting that there are few published opinions
citing “reverse bad faith,” none of which recognize the claim as a cause of action);
Douglas R. Richmond, Insured’s Bad Faith as Shield or Sword: Litigation Relief for
Insurers?, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 41, 69 (arguing in favor of a bad-faith cause of action for
insurers); Patrick E. Shipstead & Scott S. Thomas, Comparative and Reverse Bad Faith:
Insured’s Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as Affirmative Defense or
Counterclaim, 23 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 215, 216 n.7 (1987) (recognizing
California as the only state that has adopted a reverse bad-faith rule).
142. Several courts have attested to the lack of case law supporting a reverse badfaith claim. See, e.g., General Accident Ins. Co. of America v. Shah, No. 6:00-cv-489ORL28KRS, 2001 WL 273244, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2001) (adhering to the
common law when a bad-faith claim was not yet ripe for consideration); In re Tutu
Water Wells Contamination Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 436, 455 (D. V.I. 1999) (denying
insurers’ reverse bad-faith claim on summary judgment); Johnson v. Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 203, 208 (Iowa 1995) (claiming to be unaware of any
jurisdiction adopting the tort of reverse bad-faith claims); see also Willia Corroon
Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 2000) (expressing serious doubts
about whether a reverse bad-faith action exists without completely foreclosing the
recognition of such an action); cf. Parker v. D’Avolio, 664 N.E.2d 858, 864 n.9 (Mass.
Ct. App. 1996) (cautioning in a landlord tenant case that “courts be vigilant to
ensure that plaintiffs not engage in ‘reverse bad faith’ conduct”).
143. See supra Part I.A (discussing the history and development of bad faith).
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advantage in insurance transactions and at least an arguable ability to
engage in abusive acts without sufficient deterrence. It took one high
court’s ruling to set in motion changes on a national scale and
restore, albeit temporarily, a sense of balance in insurance claims144
handling.
If the history of bad-faith law is to repeat itself by recognizing a
reciprocal action for insurers against their insureds, it might well
have received its first signs of life from a court in its birthplace of
California. In California Casualty General Insurance Co. v. Superior
145
Court, the California Court of Appeal held that an insurer in a badfaith action could assert as an affirmative defense the tort concept of
146
The plaintiff in the case brought a bad-faith
comparative fault.
claim against his insurer alleging unreasonable delay in providing
coverage under an uninsured motorist claim, which the insurer
147
believed to be a questionable and potentially frivolous claim.
The insurer claimed comparative bad faith on the plaintiff’s part and
148
sought attorneys’ fees. The court agreed with the insurer and held
149
that comparative bad faith provided a valid defense. The court also
appeared to be acutely aware of the implications of its decision,
stating that “most defenses now recognized in tort cases were at one
time novel and not expressly recognized in published judicial
150
decisions.”
151
For fifteen years, this decision stood in California. In Kransco v.
152
American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co., however, the state high
court retreated from these reverse bad-faith footholds and invalidated
153
the defense. The majority reasoned that the comparative bad-faith
defense “misleadingly equates an insured’s contractual breach of the
reciprocal covenant of good faith and fair dealing with an insurer’s
144. See supra Part I.A (discussing the role of the California Supreme Court in
engineering tort recovery for bad faith).
145. 218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
146. See id. at 822 (additionally noting that the insured owed an implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing to the insurer).
147. Id. at 818–19.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 823 (explaining that while the duty of good faith is a contractual term,
breach of this duty is governed by tort principles).
150. Id. at 821.
151. The Chief Justice of California characterized California Casualty as “the
seminal California decision that has been the controlling California authority on this
issue for the past 15 years.” Kransco v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 1,
17 (Cal. 2000) (George, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
152. 2 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2000).
153. Id. at 4. The court in Kransco relied on a 1999 California Court of Appeal
decision that rejected a reverse bad-faith claim. See Agric. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 600–02 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (finding
that the reverse bad-faith claim had no support in case law).
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154

tortious breach of the covenant,” and that an insurer’s tort liability
for breach of the covenant is “predicated upon special policy factors
155
Although the court did not detail
inapplicable to the insured.”
these policy factors in its decision, they were discussed in a California
Court of Appeal opinion issued a year earlier in Agricultural Insurance
156
Co. v. Superior Court, which similarly rejected an insurer’s reverse
bad-faith claim. That court summarized the special policy factors as
follows:
An insured seeks peace of mind and economic protection against
calamity, the insurer provides that protection for a fee. Although
the insured depends upon the insurer for protection, the insurer
does not depend on the insured in the same manner. Insurers
occupy the “status as purveyors of a vital service labeled quasipublic in nature.” Thus an insurer’s obligations can include a duty
to place the interests of the insured on at least an equal footing
with its own interests, because the “obligations of good faith and
fair dealing encompass qualities of decency and humanity” similar
to the responsibilities of a fiduciary. Insurance contracts are
usually adhesive in nature, since their terms are generally
contained in form language dictated by the insurer . . . .
An insurer’s breach can therefore frustrate the core purpose of
insurance (protecting the insured from calamity) and leave the
157
insured exposed to a disaster it has paid to avoid.

These policy justifications are echoed by high courts in other states,
such as Ohio and Iowa, which have also directly addressed and
158
rejected an insurer action for reverse bad faith.
As sound public policy, such justifications appear somewhat
suspect. They are premised on the idea that despite entering the
same contract, with the same implication of good faith and fair
dealing, the actual obligations should be different because
performance of the contract “matters more” to the insured. While it
may be true that an insurer, generally speaking, has more resources
to insulate itself from financial hardship, this does not mean that the
total financial loss experienced from an act of bad faith is any less
when it happens to an insurer. Insurance fraud is estimated to cost
154. Kransco, 2 P.3d at 12.
155. Id. at 11.
156. 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
157. Id. at 600 (citations omitted); see also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d
373, 374 (Cal. 1988) (rejecting the application of the insurance law theory of tortious
breach of covenant in an employment law action).
158. See Johnson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 203, 208 (Iowa 1995)
(finding that a motion for sanctions under local rule 80(a) provides sufficient
remedy); Tokles & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern Indem. Co., 605 N.E.2d 936, 945 (Ohio
1992) (noting that insurers have other means of protection).
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159

the industry approximately $80 billion per year. Nevertheless, that
the insurer is virtually always the wealthier party in the litigation
appears to be the underlying justification for making a distinction in
the law. Insurance may be “big business,” but that has never provided
a legitimate basis to apply unequal protection under the law.
Further, in most situations, these costs are ultimately borne not by a
“wealthy insurer,” but by ordinary policyholders who end up paying
more for insurance because of the wrongful acts of relatively few
160
policyholders.
The other special factors proffered—that an insured seeks peace of
mind and that insurance contracts are adhesive—also do little to
justify disparate treatment for insurers. First, parties to any contract
seek peace of mind. It is a basic purpose of contracting. The buyer
seeks peace of mind that the seller will perform as scheduled and the
seller rests easier once it has found a buyer for its good or service.
Second, the fact that insurance contracts are adhesive has nothing to
do with the implied covenant of good faith. Contract provisions,
adhesive or not, are express terms that apply to a specific agreement,
while the implied covenant of good faith applies to every
161
agreement.
Consequently, as a matter of policy, there is little
rational justification for not allowing a reverse bad-faith claim where
a private action has been recognized under common law.
Combining the other general principles discussed, a reverse badfaith claim would likely be very limited in practice. It should only
apply to intentional and purposeful acts by claimants to either receive
a payment where payment is inappropriate, or to inflate a claim
amount. From a public policy vantage, it would provide additional
incentive for persons making a claim against an insurer to state the
measure of damages more accurately and honestly, which in turn
would reduce the costs of insurance for consumers. A reverse badfaith action would also only be appropriate where the common law
permits private enforcement against an insurer, thereby respecting
constitutional law principles discussed previously against implying
causes of action.

159. See How Big is $80 Billion?, Coalition Against Insurance Fraud,
http://www.insurancefraud.org/80_billion.htm (last visited July 27, 2009)
(illustrating the extent of the loss that results from insurance fraud).
160. See generally Insurance Fraud, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/fraud/insurance_fraud.htm (last visited July 27,
2009) (explaining that insurance fraud costs the average U.S. family between $400
and $700 per year in the form of increased premiums).
161. See Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 104 N.E. 622, 624 (N.Y. 1914) (recognizing
that the good-faith requirement underlies all contracts).
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Moreover, a reverse bad-faith action would be less akin to creating
a new cause of action than applying an existing action equally.
Also, given the respective roles in an insurance relationship, the
appropriate extra-contractual remedy for the insurer in most
instances would be limited to attorneys’ fees for the claimant’s willful
162
Although courts have yet to embrace
and malicious conduct.
reverse bad-faith actions, such actions comport with objectives of
fundamental fairness and equal protection, and greater system
163
efficiency and effectiveness.
Also vital to these public policy
objectives is the fact that an overwhelming number of “honest”
policyholders would benefit from lower premiums if the acts of
dishonest policyholders were properly sanctioned.
B. Principles Applicable to Bad-Faith Statutes
1. Courts need to clearly identify who may bring a statutory “bad-faith”
action
Independent of the common law, state legislatures have enacted
statutes to govern bad faith in insurance claims handling.
As previously discussed, these laws were derived from model
legislation and many incorporate the same or substantially similar
164
Also as discussed, many of these laws suffer
provisions.
shortcomings that have led courts to apply widely divergent
interpretations and have caused inconsistency in the state of bad-faith
165
law. One of the most basic shortcomings is that many of these laws
are ambiguous as to who may bring a statutory cause of action for bad
faith.

162. In a related issue, a majority of courts permit an insurer to recover attorneys’
fees where the insurer defends non-covered acts under the insurance agreement.
See Joseph Cunningham & James Markels, Attorneys’ Fees Incurred In Defending
Insurance Policy Non-Covered Claims: Who Pays?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 69,
74–76 (2007) (reviewing majority and minority views across various jurisdictions);
see also Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am. v. Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 828 N.E.2d 1092,
1098 (Ill. 2005) (considering whether a contract must stipulate the right to recover
costs and attorneys’ fees).
An insurer’s decision to initially provide representation in a situation where such
representation is not required is often made out of fear of subsequent bad-faith
litigation in the event the insurer is mistaken. See supra note 9 and accompanying
text (discussing rising costs and increasing damage awards in bad-faith suits).
163. See Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and
Litigation, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 136–37 (1994) (enumerating reasons why courts
should apply reserve bad faith).
164. See supra Part I.B (discussing the various types of bad faith claims settlement
statutes adopted from state to state).
165. See supra Part I.B.
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Identification of a class of potential claimants is particularly
important due to another alleged flaw in many states’ laws: the
166
varying degree of culpability necessary to establish bad faith.
A claimant who is unable to bring a common-law action for bad faith
because the level of culpability requires an intentional or reckless act
will instead attempt a statutory cause of action where lesser
misconduct—e.g., negligence—may support a claim. Courts should
identify the scope of such statutes not only to prevent this derogation
of the common law, but also to establish clear boundaries to reduce
uncertainty or unfair surprise for litigants.
Principles of statutory construction provide the starting point in
determining the scope of ambiguous claims settlement laws, and the
167
text, context, and history of these laws should carry the day.
Again, as a general principle, where a statute does not expressly
create a private cause of action, courts should exercise a high level of
168
restraint before implying one. Similarly, where the text of a claims
settlement statute expressly states that the insurance commissioner
may bring an action or impose a fine (as most of the statutes do), but
where the statute fails to mention a similar right for an individual
claimant, courts should hold that the legislature did not intend a
private right of action. Courts addressing this issue have almost
169
uniformly agreed and precluded a right.
Where a statute omits reference to public or private enforcement,
the context and history of the law deserve deference. In every state,
the claims settlement statute is included in a code section regulating
170
the practice of insurance. This body of law is enforced by the state
insurance department and typically does not provide for private
enforcement.
In contrast, in states like Rhode Island and
Pennsylvania where a private right of action for bad faith is expressly
provided, the state legislature has included that right under a
166. See supra Part I.B.
167. See City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 129 (2005)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that when the Court “perform[s] this gap-filling
task, it is appropriate not only to study the text and structure of the statutory scheme,
but also to examine its legislative history”).
168. See cases cited supra note 111 (cautioning against an implied cause of action).
169. See cases cited supra notes 60–61 (discussing claims that were based on an
implied cause of action). In 1990, NAIC approved a separate model act entitled the
Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act. UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES
ACT § 1, reprinted in NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND
GUIDELINES 900–01 (1991). This Act, unlike the 1972 model legislation, contains a
“Drafting Note” stating that any jurisdiction choosing to provide a private cause of
action should consider a different statutory scheme, and that the Act “is inherently
inconsistent with a private cause of action.” Id.
170. See supra note 47 (listing the various state statutes that address bad-faith and
unfair insurance claims).
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171

separate section of law, such as the civil code, or through a
172
The placement of these laws in state
constitutional amendment.
regulatory codes as opposed to sections relevant to individuals’ rights
suggests that the law is meant for public enforcement. Also, in other
173
states expressly codifying a private right of action, like Montana and
174
Florida, the private action is codified in separate statutes.
Historically, claims settlement statutes represented a push by state
legislatures to compliment the common law, not to override it.
The statutes were enacted during the same period in which states first
expanded their common law to include bad faith; statutes and
common law were thus at the same level of development. There was
little need to expedite the law’s passage if only to codify private
enforcement of common law. Rather, it is more plausible that these
laws were designed to provide a separate level of protection through
state regulatory enforcement.
Overall, the construction of states’ claims settlement statutes leads
to the conclusion that enforcement should be deemed exclusive to a
state’s insurance department or commissioner. Courts not yet
addressing the complete scope of unfair claims settlement laws
should, therefore, refrain from expanding the action to first-party or
third-party claimants.
From an enforcement perspective, the
regulatory and common law systems left in place are also more
175
consistent. The state regulates unreasonable insurer practices and
takes enforcement action against violators through its insurance
regulatory arm, and the common law is left to redress intentional and
reckless acts above contractual or compensatory damages. The fact
that the common law of bad faith continues to develop (in contrast to
claims settlement statutes that are changed less often) also makes the
common law ideally suited to addressing more culpable and varied
insurer “bad” acts. By clearly identifying the scope of ambiguous
unfair claims statutes as publicly enforceable by state insurance
regulators, courts can establish a simpler, more efficient system of
enforcement.

171. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-33 (2008) (allowing an insured to bring a bad-faith
action against the insurer).
172. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371 (2008) (allowing courts to award interest,
punitive damages, costs, and fees if they have found that the insurer acted in bad
faith towards the insured).
173. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-242 (2007).
174. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.155 (2009).
175. See supra Part II.A.2 (arguing that bad-faith claims should not both be
privately litigated and should instead fall under the state’s regulatory scheme).

1514

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1477

2. Overly mechanical application of deadlines for reasonable investigation
and payment of claims should be avoided
A central concept present in all claims settlement statutes is
176
If an insurer fails to process, investigate, or pay a
reasonableness.
claim within a “reasonable” period, then its delay may constitute an
177
act of bad faith.
Generally, in a statutory action brought by the
state insurance commissioner or, where permitted, a private
178
claimant, the determination of a reasonable period is made by a
179
Given the wide spectrum of circumstances that could make
jury.
delay more reasonable in one case than in another, and given the
clear potential for over- and under-inclusiveness in attempting to
provide greater definition to what is reasonable, the law appropriately
leaves this decision in jurors’ hands. A significant minority of states,
however, supplant this jury function by legislating strict time periods
180
for unreasonable delay in insurance claims-handling.
For example, in states like Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and South
Dakota, an insurer violates the state’s unfair claims settlement act
181
whenever it fails to respond to a claim within thirty days.
In Georgia, Missouri, and Nebraska, an insurer must provide to a
claimant the necessary claims forms within fifteen days of a
182
reasonable request. Other states set the period of reasonableness at
183
184
ten or twenty days.

176. See supra note 47 (listing the various state statutes that address bad-faith and
unfair insurance claims). In some states, like Alabama, the statute contains the
terminology “without just cause,” which approximates to a reasonableness test.
ALA. CODE § 27-12-24 (2009).
177. See, e.g., Filasky v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 734 P.2d 76 (Ariz. 1988);
Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994); Fehring v. Republic Ins. Co.,
347 N.W.2d 595 (Wis. 1984); see also Henderson, supra note 88, at 1159–60
(enumerating acts of bad faith in addition to unreasonable delay or denial of
claims).
178. A key distinction here is that the standard under most statutory actions
brought by the state insurance commissioner is negligence, while only a minority of
states permit private statutory enforcement under this reasonableness standard or
under the state’s common law standard. See supra Part I (discussing the history and
development of bad faith and bad-faith statutes).
179. See supra note 79 (recognizing the flexibility given to juries in determining
what constitutes bad faith).
180. Such states include Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
181. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36 § 1250.4(C) (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-9.1-4(a)(16)
(2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33-67(1) (2008).
182. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-34(11) (2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 375.1007(13) (2008);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1540(14) (2008).
183. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-9.1-4(a)(13) (2009).
184. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.015 (2009).
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Even more restrictive are time limits dictating when a claim must
be settled or paid. In New Mexico and West Virginia, for instance, an
insurer has ninety days to pay a claim after the insured files a proof of
185
186
loss form. In Connecticut, this period is only forty-five days, and
187
in Nevada and Wisconsin it is thirty days.
While statutory deadlines can provide a useful benchmark for
determining what is reasonable under the circumstances of a
particular insurance claim, and can provide an incentive for insurers
to act promptly, they should not, in the event of a missed deadline,
necessarily trigger tort liability for bad faith. Rather, strict adherence
to a statutory time period imposes a negligence per se rule. Such
unbending application fails to provide latitude for reasonable excuses
or other unintentional errors or miscommunications that ordinarily
act to preclude a bad-faith action.
Strict adherence to time limitations as a basis for a bad-faith claim
188
represents poor public policy for several reasons.
First, as
mentioned above, such strict adherence diminishes the vital role of
the jury in the civil justice system, and does so in perhaps the most
suitable subject area for a jury to determine; that is, whether
something sounds reasonable to an ordinary person. Second, a hard
deadline removes any determination of culpability, such as whether
the insurer intentionally acted to cause an unreasonable delay or
denial of a claim; this determination is essential in evaluating the
extent of liability and the amount of punishment necessary to deter
similar acts in the future. Third, strict enforcement of a deadline for
bad-faith purposes demonstrates a lack of understanding and an
attempt at standardization in an industry where every insurance claim
is different and requires varying levels of attention. Finally, and most
importantly, strict enforcement of a statutory deadline provides an
incentive for a claimant to abuse the insurance system, which is
189
already rife with attempts at fraud.
185. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-16-20(F) (2008); W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9)(o) (2008).
186. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38A-816(15)(B) (2008). Connecticut’s statute contains
an exception to this deadline where the information provided under a claim is
deficient.
187. NEV. REV. STAT. § 690B.012 (2009); WIS. STAT. § 628.46 (2008).
188. One type of strict time restriction, which exists in several states, applies to the
payment of claims after the insurer has affirmatively acknowledged liability and
should be viewed in a separate light. For example, in Hawaii and Maine, an insurer
has thirty days to tender payment after accepting liability. See HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 431:13-103(11)(F) (2008); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24-A § 2436(1) (2008). This situation
is distinguishable because the claim-processing and investigation periods have
terminated. The insurer has an undisputed liability, meaning it is less likely that
there is a reasonable basis for not paying within the legislatively prescribed period.
189. See supra note 159 (noting the annual losses to the insurance companies).
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If a claimant can prevail in a cause of action for bad faith whenever
an insurer fails to meet a statute’s arbitrary deadline, the claimant is
more likely to engage in delay tactics or otherwise frustrate the
190
insurer’s claims-handling process.
Simple yet effective strategies
include throwing out claims forms or other correspondence,
changing a mailing address to delay actual receipt of forms, or
providing deficient information to extend the investigation process.
Where there is an ultimate deadline for payment, the claimant can
bolster his or her bargaining position by unreasonably refusing to
settle a claim for anything less than the policy limit.
A claimant may also be able to successfully lure an insurer into
committing a bad faith violation by purporting to negotiate in good
191
faith. For example, in Berges v. Infinity Insurance Co., the Florida
Supreme Court permitted a bad-faith claim to proceed against an
insurer where the insurer entered an agreement to pay the insured’s
policy limits within the required time deadline, but had not yet
192
formally consummated the settlement and dispersed the money.
This occurred because the insurer could not forward actual payment
until the claimant had the legal authority to execute releases on
behalf of the estate and guardianship for the underlying wrongful
193
death claim. As one of the dissenting judges recognized:
[T]here are strategies which have developed in the pursuit of
insurance claims which are employed to create bad-faith claims
against insurers when, after an objective, advised view of the
insurer’s claims handling, bad faith did not occur . . . . Obviously,
this strategy worked well for the claimants and their attorneys in
194
this particular case.

The ease of proof, a missed deadline, also makes strict
enforcement of these laws disconcerting.
Statutes supposedly
designed to facilitate reasonable investigation of insurance claims
remove the court’s ability to investigate what really occurred. Most of
these time restrictions look only to whether the period has expired,
and not to who caused the lapse; in doing so, the restrictions
190. See Robert W. Emerson, Insurance Adjusters and Plaintiffs’ Attorneys: From
Claims Fraud Consensus to Settlement Reform, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 538, 567–68 (1993)
(noting that the ease with which claimants can pursue a bad-faith claim adversely
impacts insurers’ ability to investigate because they are working within shorter time
constraints imposed by the claimant).
191. 896 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 2004).
192. Id. at 676.
193. See id. at 692 (Cantero, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority placed the
insurer in a tough position by giving it the option of forwarding payment to a person
not authorized to execute a release or to be subject to a bad-faith lawsuit).
194. Id. at 685 (Wells, J., dissenting).
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effectively encourage bad faith or unreasonable behavior by a
claimant. This result is compounded by the lack of a reciprocal bad195
Instead, the insurer is left with little
faith action for insurers.
recourse other than a fraud action, which is a comparatively more
difficult lawsuit to maintain and prevail in than a lawsuit where the
insurer is only required to show a purposeful or reckless act by the
196
claimant.
To prevent such abuse, courts should refrain from overly
mechanical application of statutory time periods for claims-handling
and payment, and leave it to a trier of fact to construe an insurer’s
actions with a view as to the reasonableness of the insurer’s actions
under the circumstances. State legislatures, for their part, must also
appreciate the unintended negative consequences that strict
adherence to time limits can cause, and should provide express
197
exceptions for reasonable delay.
Further, both courts and
legislatures can avoid the destructive power shift of per se violations
of claims-processing deadlines by applying the principles discussed in
this Article. Namely, requiring intentional or reckless acts to
maintain any bad-faith action, identifying exclusive enforcement by
state regulators where a statute is ambiguous, refusing to use unfair
claims settlement statutes as a proxy for common law actions,
recognizing a right to cure, and permitting reverse bad faith actions
would all help preclude abuse of hard deadlines for claims handling.
3.

Courts should recognize meaningful exceptions to bad-faith statutes
A broader issue related to rigid time limits in insurance claims
settlement statutes is the need for courts to recognize meaningful
198
Because
statutory exceptions to safeguard the interests of justice.
most claims settlement statutes establish liability for actions deemed
unreasonable as opposed to intentional, courts should exercise a
greater degree of leniency and understanding to the conditions faced
by insurers. This is necessary, in part, to respect the fact that actions

195. See sources cited supra Part II.A.5 (arguing for a limited bad-faith action for
insurers against claimants).
196. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text (explaining that bad-faith
action developed for claimants as a result of the difficulty of maintaining a fraud
action).
197. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 628.46(2) (West 2004) (providing an exception for
the thirty-day period in which the insurer must pay a claim where there is no
recipient legally able to give a valid release for such payment or where the insurer is
unable to determine who is entitled to receive payment).
198. This principle also incorporates many of the same justifications for a right to
cure. See supra Part II.A.4 (arguing that insurers should have a right to cure a minor
infraction to ensure that bad-faith law focuses solely on intentional, bad acts).
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held unreasonable by courts enforcing a private statutory cause of
action will likely trigger an additional penalty through state
199
Courts should, therefore, recognize
regulatory oversight.
exceptions where an insurer’s actions are “fairly debatable” under the
200
circumstances of a claim investigation, or where an insurer’s actions
201
are reasonable but nevertheless lead to an incorrect outcome.
A Mississippi Supreme Court case, Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v.
202
Tompkins, provides an example demonstrating the need to respect
an insurer’s reasonable, yet ultimately incorrect decisions. Although
the case involved a common law action, the same principles of
reasonableness discussed in this Article fit within the often more
stringent confines of a state’s statutes. In that case, an uninsured
motorist backed out of her driveway and was struck by the insured
203
defendant’s motorcycle.
The insured filed an uninsured motorist
claim with his insurer, and a claims adjuster initially denied the claim
believing that the defendant’s coverage applied only to the two cars
204
listed on the policy. Five months later, the insurer received a letter
from the insured’s attorney requesting further investigation and
205
settlement.
An attorney for the insurer took over the claim
investigation, and was advised by local counsel for the area where the
206
accident took place that the effective policy limit was $20,000.
207
The insurer promptly offered $20,000, which was declined.
199. See supra note 104 (citing a Rhode Island statute that establishes a damages
range for each insurer violation up to $250,000).
200. See, e.g., Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 45 P.3d 829, 832 (Idaho
2002) (requiring the insured to prove as part of its prima facie case that the insurer’s
denial was not fairly debatable); Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co., 799 A.2d 997, 1010
(R.I. 2002) (allowing the insurer to debate a claim that is fairly debatable).
201. The Nevada Supreme Court expressed this concern in Powers v. United Services
Automobile Ass’n:
A mere incorrect or “improper” denial of a claim is not tortious. A company
may, in the utmost of good faith and propriety, deny a claim, only to have it
proven later, in court, that its denial of the claim was improper and that the
claimant was, indeed, entitled to indemnity. Under the instruction as given,
all an insurance company would have to do to become liable to its insured
for commission of the bad-faith tort would be to deny mistakenly a claim
“without proper cause,” that is to say, to deny a questionable claim that it
should, properly, have paid—a rather common occurrence in the insurance
world.
962 P.2d 596, 620 (Nev. 1998); see also O’Leary-Alison v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
752 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (refusing to hold an insurer’s good-faith,
but mistaken valuation of damages as a violation of the state’s claims settlement
statute).
202. 490 So. 2d 897 (Miss. 1986).
203. Id. at 898–99.
204. Id. at 900.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 901.
207. Id.
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The insured’s attorney responded with a demand for $50,000 to be
paid in five days or a lawsuit would commence alleging compensatory
208
The insurer then sought a declaratory
and punitive damages.
209
judgment in federal court to determine the correct policy limit.
When the court found that the effective limit was $50,000, the insurer
210
immediately offered that amount, which was refused as well.
The subsequent bad-faith lawsuit resulted in $50,000 in
compensatory damages and $400,000 in punitive damages against the
211
insurer. The jury also found that the uninsured motorist, who was
joined in the action, was modestly negligent and returned a verdict of
212
only $500. Rather, the insured, who sustained serious injuries, was
213
In other words,
held to have contributed heavily to the accident.
because the insured was the primary cause of his accident, “the
insurer would have had ample reason to dispute the claim vigorously
and to question whether any payment was due even if it recognized
214
$50,000 in coverage from the outset.”
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court ultimately reduced the
compensatory award to $500, yet affirmed the punitive damages
award on the ground that the insurer should not have included an
215
ambiguous and invalid exclusion provision in its contracts, the case
illustrates how a trial court can unreasonably punish an insurer.
True, the insurer was incorrect, but when made aware of its error the
insurer twice offered what it reasonably believed to be the policy
limit, and did so in a case in which it might not have been obligated
to pay at all.
In situations where the insurer’s actions prove incorrect,
compensatory relief is the appropriate remedy, including any interest
216
and attorneys’ fees for the delay caused by litigation.
However,
additional penalties for bad faith, like punitive damages, are
unjustified where misjudgment or miscalculation provides the basis
for an unreasonable delay or denial of a claim. While the common
law of most states rejects such bad-faith claims by requiring
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 901–02.
214. William T. Barker & Paul E.B. Glad, Use of Summary Judgment in Defense of Bad
Faith Actions Involving First-Party Insurance, 30 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 49, 79
(1994) (emphasis in original).
215. Tompkins, 490 So. 2d at 903.
216. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 3629 (West 1999) (prescribing a fifteen
percent annual rate of interest for bad-faith claims settlement beginning from the
date the loss was payable until the date of the verdict).
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intentional unreasonable delay or denial, statutes giving rise to a
private right of action may lack this standard. Hence, courts
interpreting statutory private rights of action should, as routine
practice, recognize exceptions that protect the right of the insurer to
217
contest a claim without malice, and occasionally be incorrect.
4. Comparisons to insurer offers and amounts ultimately recovered through
litigation represent poor policy for allowing bad-faith claims to proceed
The need for courts to articulate meaningful exceptions to badfaith statutes is particularly evident with regard to a common
provision in the statutes of most states that compares an insurer’s
settlement offer with the amount ultimately awarded through
litigation. The provision typically states that an insurer cannot
engage in a practice of offering claimants “substantially less” than the
218
As an indicator of bad
amount ultimately recovered in a lawsuit.
faith, this provision is over-inclusive and misleading, and as policy,
unjust and oppressive. The insurer can effectively be punished for
acting reasonably and in good faith at all times.
Choosing to litigate an insurance claim is a costly undertaking for
an insurer, regardless of the economies of scale an insurer might
possess. There are attorneys’ fees and other unavoidable costs, and
the outcome is uncertain. Insurers are also not blind to the poor
public perception of their industry; a perception that contributed to
the creation of tort liability in insurance contracts where it does not
219
exist in other contexts.
The prospect of paying extra-contractual
damages, especially punitive damages, is itself daunting; this daunting
prospect is enhanced by the insurer’s position as an unpopular
defendant and the belief of many juries that insurers have deep
217. A number of state statutes include express exceptions for claims delays where
the insurer is conducting or cooperating with an investigation into arson or fraud.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.18(2)(c) (West Supp. 2008) (creating an exception
where the insurer is conducting or cooperating with a timely investigation into arson
or fraud). Such a caveat is important to respecting an insurer’s ability to reasonably
contest or investigate suspect claims without being pressured into paying the claim to
avoid a bad-faith lawsuit, especially in the event that the insurer’s reasonable
suspicion ultimately does not evidence arson or fraud.
218. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 27-4-1-4.5(7) (LexisNexis 1999) (allowing insureds
to recover amounts due under an insurance policy when the insurer offers
substantially less than the amount ultimately recovered in a lawsuit).
219. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Land Developers Constr. Co., 882 So. 2d 291, 304
(Ala. 2003) (Houston, J., concurring) (observing that outside of the insurance
context, parties to a contract may breach even in bad faith without being subject to
liability for fraud or bad-faith tort unless the fraud is perpetrated in inducing a party
to enter a contract); Recycleworlds Consulting Corp. v. Wis. Bell, 592 N.W.2d 637,
643 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to permit punitive damages or tortious breach of
contract where the underlying cause of action is breach of contract).
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220

pockets and can afford it.
In addition, any plaintiff verdict could
lead to negative press, which could cause existing policyholders to
change insurers or could deter future customers. A particularly high
damage award could also provide harmful precedential value and
inflate other award amounts. For these reasons, insurers are poised
to settle claims they reasonably believe they will lose, as well as some
they believe they should win. Settlement simply becomes the better
221
option.
The high degree of caution insurers exercise before turning to
litigation as a last resort is both reasonable and in the insurer’s selfinterest. Quite simply, there is no rational incentive for the insurer to
“low-ball” a final settlement offer and then proceed with litigation it
believes it will lose. Yet claims settlement statutes do not consider
these practical mechanics, nor do they search out intentional and
222
reckless behavior.
They look only to the magnitude of difference
between settlement and verdict.
A reality of any civil justice system is that juries may return
223
disproportionate awards. Also, the insurer’s internal calculation of
the merits and costs associated with a case may be flawed as they are
based on imperfect information. Indeed, critical questions like the
permissible limits of punitive damages awards are still being fleshed
224
out. The result is that an insurer may be confronted with a higher
verdict than it reasonably, and presumably in good faith (if acting in
its own self-interest), anticipated. The difference between the final
settlement offer and the verdict is then expected to be substantial in
amount. This outcome is predetermined by the insurer’s initial
decision to litigate, and it is this outcome that provides the frequency
220. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 491 (1993)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that because corporations represent large
accumulations of wealth, juries may be more inclined to award large judgments to
what they perceive as “needier plaintiffs”).
221. See Barker, supra note 214, at 49 (noting that insurers may settle in an attempt
to avoid sympathetic juries that may award inflated damages).
222. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 3629 (West 1999) (imposing a duty on
insurers to submit a written offer of settlement or rejection within ninety days of
receipt of proof of loss without exception).
223. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2625 (2008) (reasoning that
the core problem with punitive damages awards is not frequent, excessive awards, but
rather the unpredictability with which they are awarded).
224. See id. at 2633 (determining that a one-to-one ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages provided the appropriate limit under admiralty common law
for the environmental damages caused by an oil tanker spill); Phillip Morris USA v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) (holding that a multi-million dollar punitive
damages award against a cigarette manufacturer violated procedural due process);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (holding that a
$145 million punitive damages award based on $1 million in compensatory damages
resulting from insurance bad faith exceeded due process boundaries).
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or pattern of substantially disparate amounts necessary to maintain
the statutory action. Taking this to its logical conclusion, the insurer,
to avoid a statutory action for offering “substantially less than the
amounts ultimately recovered,” should never choose to litigate a
claim—an unrealistic and untenable argument that would supersede
the basic objective of protecting against fraud and overpayment in
225
insurance claims-handling.
Comparing the final settlement offer to the amount recovered is
also unsound policy because it amounts to an additional level of
punishment where the insurer has previously been punished. For the
difference between an insurer’s final settlement offer and verdict to
rise to an amount characterized as “substantial,” it can be assumed
that the insurer paid some level of extra-contractual damages.
As addressed earlier with regard to the potential for double
punishment in bad-faith actions, tort liability, punitive damages, and
regulatory penalties can operate to inflict multiple levels of damages
226
beyond the policy limit of the insurance contract.
Permitting
additional tort liability, including the possibility of a second punitive
damages award, where the basis for that recovery is in part due to the
high magnitude of the original award, is excessive. It is also wholly
unjustified where the insurer’s incentive to act reasonably is already
aligned with its self-interest.
Courts interpreting these statutory bad-faith provisions have
reasonable options to mitigate injustices, while holding true to the
letter of these laws. First, courts can limit excessive extra-contractual
awards, like punitive damages, to indirectly lessen substantial
differences between settlement and verdict. For instance, in Exxon
227
Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Supreme Court recently recognized, under
admiralty law, a one-to-one ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages as the permissible limit for a compensatory
228
award.
Second, courts could more directly identify unreasonable
insurer conduct by interpreting the “amounts ultimately recovered”
as those compensatory amounts recovered, and by using that
225. A stronger public policy argument for the comparison between a settlement
offer and a final award exists where the insurer’s final settlement offer is less than the
policy limit and will require the insured to pay out-of-pocket expenses. However, the
law already finds this practice to be a form of bad faith. See supra notes 26–28 and
accompanying text (discussing extra-contractual duties to settle third-party claims
including situations where an insurer refused to defend the claim within the
insured’s policy limits).
226. See supra Part II.A.2 (arguing that courts should refrain from permitting badfaith actions because it leads to duplicative penalties).
227. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
228. Id. at 2633.
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interpretation as the basis for comparison. This provides a more
objective measure of the reasonableness of a final settlement offer
and avoids less-defined damages standards and determinations that
may be rooted more in bias against insurers than in fact. Insurers can
reasonably and in good faith miscalculate a case, and it is up to courts
to protect and not penalize this possibility.
5.

Principles for the statutory recovery of attorneys’ fees in bad-faith actions
The final subject in this analysis on the law of bad faith concerns
provisions for attorneys’ fees. A number of states have found
229
exceptions to the so-called “American Rule,” which requires that
each party bear the cost of its litigation, and expressly provide
230
recovery for attorneys’ fees in bad-faith insurance statutes.
These laws typically state that the claimant may be awarded a
“reasonable” fee amount, but they fail to address the scope of
compensable fees. For instance, attorneys may attempt to recover
fees associated with recruiting other plaintiffs to join a bad-faith
lawsuit, fees for time spent developing bad-faith arguments that will
be attempted in future cases—and not in the prevailing plaintiffs’
individual case—or more commonly, fees for their prosecution of the
contract-coverage dispute generally rather than the purported bad
faith.
229. See, e.g., Goodover v. Lindey’s Inc., 843 P.2d 765, 774 (Mont. 1992) (stating
that absent statutory or contractual provision, attorneys’ fees will be limited to
situations where a party has been forced into a frivolous lawsuit and must incur the
fees to dismiss the claim); Barnes v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 11 P.3d 162,
180 (Okla. 2000) (creating exceptions to the American Rule where an opponent in
litigation has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, or for oppressive reasons).
230. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01(A) (West 2001) (awarding
attorneys’ fees to a defendant where the settlement offer is greater than the verdict);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1839(4) (2002) (where the suit has been pursued or defended
frivolously); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 2436 (West 2000) (“reasonable” attorneys’
fees provision if overdue benefits are recovered in an action against the insurer);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 3629 (West 1999) (providing attorneys’ fees to the
prevailing party); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-59-40 (West 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 58-12-3 (West 2004) (prevailing insured is entitled to fees if it establishes that
insurer’s refusal to pay or defend is “vexatious or without reasonable cause”);
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-209(A). Similarly, states such as Colorado and Ohio rely on
more general statutes to permit the award of attorneys’ fees for bad faith.
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-17-101 (2008) (allowing attorneys’ fees to address the
problem of excessive litigation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2721.16 (LexisNexis 2005)
(granting attorneys’ fees on equitable principles in claims for declaratory relief).
A number of states have also recognized the need to protect a claimant’s ability to
challenge the allegedly wrongful acts of insurers, and permit recovery for attorneys’
fees under common law. See ACMAT Corp. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 923 A.2d
697, 705 (Conn. 2007) (observing that nine states (Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin) have created
common-law exceptions where the litigation is the result of the bad faith of the
insurer).
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Recovery of attorneys’ fees is inappropriate in these cases because
231
the fees are not directly associated with the claimant’s bad-faith suit.
In the absence of practical guidelines, insurers run the risk of overcompensating claimants’ attorneys. Thus, as a general principle,
courts should limit the recovery of attorneys’ fees to those fees
associated with the demonstrated statutory violation from which the
plaintiff prevails.
Such fairness in litigation can be achieved through relatively
unobtrusive means. A court could require a sworn statement by the
attorney separating the fees spent on the claimant’s bad-faith claim
from those spent on attenuated matters, or, at least, require a goodfaith estimate of the bad-faith fee allocation if specific records are
unavailable. Courts might also require that bad-faith claimants keep
records in order to ensure a just accounting of fee awards.
In states like Illinois, the legislature has indirectly safeguarded
against over-compensation for attorneys’ fees recovery by limiting the
total fee award to the greater of sixty percent of the jury’s award or
232
$60,000. However, as another general principle, courts should base
an award of attorneys’ fees not on what a jury returns, but rather on
233
the final judgment of the court.
This is especially important in
contingency fee agreements—which are common in bad-faith
litigation—because basing the fee on the final judgment protects
against the consequences that follow when a percentage fee award is
based on a verdict amount that is subsequently held to be excessive.
Minnesota’s newly enacted statute governing attorneys’ fees in
insurance bad-faith cases provides a good example of a carefully
constructed law. The law limits the fee award to “reasonable attorney
fees actually incurred to establish the insurer’s [bad-faith] violation”
and states that the fees “may be awarded only if the fees sought are
separately accounted for by the insured’s attorney and are not
duplicative of the fees for the insured’s attorney otherwise expended
234
in pursuit of proceeds for the insured under the insurance policy.”
235
The statute further caps the maximum fee award at $100,000.
231. See Taylor v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 981 P.2d 1253, 1258 (Okla. 1999)
(interpreting the scope of the state’s general attorney’s fees statute in a bad-faith
insurance action to award fees on the recovery of the insured’s loss and not on the
theory of liability).
232. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/155(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2007).
233. See, e.g., Vest v. Travelers Ins. Co., 753 So. 2d 1270, 1276 (Fla. 2000) (holding
that bad-faith claims do not accrue prior to the approval of settlement); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Sutton, 707 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (requiring that any
attorneys’ fees award be based on the court’s final judgment).
234. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.18(3)(a)(2) (West Supp. 2008).
235. Id.
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The insurer is, therefore, still penalized for its bad-faith violation, but
that additional penalty is directly related to the specific offense and is
limited to protect against inappropriate or excessive fee awards.
The decision to break from traditional rules and to award
attorneys’ fees in insurance bad-faith cases is one appropriately left to
236
state legislatures. Where the insured’s payment of attorneys’ fees is
out-of-pocket, the circumstances appear most compelling in favor of
fee shifting; however, the prevalence and availability of contingency
fee arrangements in which the insured is not required to front
monies to maintain a claim may effectively remove this barrier to sue.
Yet, regardless of the fee arrangement or public policy rationales,
courts, by more precisely defining the scope of fair compensation for
attorneys, can improve the efficiency and justice in the civil system.
III. PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS MORE PRINCIPLED APPLICATION
OF BAD-FAITH LAWS
Expansion of bad faith has, contrary to the assertions of some legal
237
experts over a decade ago, not reached “maturity.” Multi-million
dollar extra-contractual awards for bad faith are increasingly
238
commonplace, and the state of the law reveals inconsistencies in
239
structure, standards, and application, many of which have been
240
aggressively targeted or manipulated to the detriment of insurers.

236. Commentators have identified four areas where legislatures and courts have
found an exception to the American Rule: (1) where the losing party has acted in
bad faith; (2) where the litigation results in the creation or enhancement of a
common fund from which attorneys’ fees can be paid; (3) where the litigation
provides a “substantial benefit” to a certain class of people; and (4) where the litigant
has served as a “private attorney general” in righting some constitutional or statutory
wrong. See generally Miotke v. City of Spokane, 678 P.2d 803, 820–22 (Wash. 1984)
(en banc) (listing four recognized grounds for an exception to the general rule: bad
faith, common fund, protection of constitutional principles, and private attorney
general); Karla H. Alderman, Making Sense of Oregon’s Equitable Exception to the
American Rule of Attorneys’ Fees After Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 407,
417–18 (1999) (referencing bad faith, common fund, substantial benefit, and private
attorney general as four exceptions to the American Rule); John F. Vargo,
The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 1567, 1584 (1993) (discussing exceptions to the American Rule, including
common fund, substantial benefit, and bad faith).
237. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, The Natural History of the Insurer’s Liability for
Bad Faith, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1295, 1295 (1994) (arguing that a reduction in bad-faith
lawsuits has resulted in a lessened threat to insurers as well as a lessened incentive to
plaintiffs who bring bad-faith lawsuits).
238. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (noting recent trends pointing to an
increase in bad-faith litigation).
239. See supra Part I (observing that while there are often substantial similarities in
bad-faith statutes, there is inconsistency in judicial interpretation of these statutes).
240. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (comparing the gap in
interpretation between the legislature and courts of Colorado).
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While the overriding purpose of bad-faith laws is to safeguard the
interests of claimants—an assuredly valid and worthwhile objective—
the law in certain instances has gone too far and has deviated from
the goal of bad-faith claims. Insurers can be punished for reasonable
241
actions even where the law purports to require a culpable offense.
Similarly, any insurer mistake, reasonable or unreasonable, may be
punished severely regardless of whether there was an actual intent to
engage in bad faith. As a basic matter of fairness and justice, this
result is unacceptable.
The principles outlined in this Article seek to redress areas of
abuse and restore a much needed sense of balance in the law of bad
faith. At the same time, these principles seek to provide greater
substance and form to the meaning of bad faith, and enhance the
efficiency and effectiveness of the insurance claims-processing system.
Establishing a more just system of compensation and curbing the flow
of improper claims reduces the costs of insurance. This benefits the
overwhelming majority of insureds and also permits the entry of new
consumers into the insurance market who were previously priced out.
In comparison, allowing bad-faith litigation to continue to expand to
less culpable insurer practices provides only a small fraction of
claimants with a windfall recovery. Tort litigation is a costly and
imprecise enforcement tool useful only in limited instances where an
insurer willfully schemes to deny compensation to a claimant or to
intentionally delay payment. It is rendered even less necessary where,
as in the practice of insurance, other market forces exist to provide
substantial disincentives for acting in bad faith.
A. Market Forces Demand That Insurers Self-Regulate
By any account, the insurance industry is massive in scale. In 2008
242
alone, insurers collected over $4 trillion in premiums globally.
With such an incredible potential market, it is not surprising that the
industry is extremely competitive. National insurers such as Geico,
Progressive, Allstate, and State Farm each spend hundreds of millions
243
of dollars every year advertising directly to consumers.
Often, the
241. See supra Part II and accompanying text (discussing excessive penalties, the
one-sidedness of bad-faith litigation, and the dangers of finding liability where there
is none).
242. Insurance Information Institute, International Insurance Fact Book,
http://www.iii.org/international/overview/ (last visited July 27, 2009).
243. See Lavonne Kuykendall, Geico Advertising Spending Tops Among Auto Insurers in
‘06, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Sept. 19, 2007, available at http://insurance
headlines.com/Auto-Insurance/3882.html (listing the auto-insurance advertising
expenditures of the top four national insurers and estimating that auto-insurance
advertising alone would exceed $1.7 billion for 2007).
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goal of these advertisements is not to solicit new, uninsured
customers, but rather to convince another insurer’s customers to
switch providers. Smaller, local insurers also have a role in this
heavily fragmented industry, finding more niche areas of property
coverage or even competing with national insurers on price. In such
a highly competitive environment, and given the standard function of
insurance, the two primary means of differentiation for an insurer are
price and quality of service.
For insureds, this high level of competition represents a much
improved bargaining position. Out of necessity, insurers now cannot
afford to engage in any action that could be construed as bad faith.
This result is independent of tort liability or the threat of tort
litigation. Included in the insurer’s quality of service is its reputation,
and consumers are unlikely to continue purchasing insurance from
an insurer who they, by word of mouth or through other channels,
perceive to be dishonest or unreputable. With many available
alternatives at their fingertips, insureds can easily, and at nominal
244
cost, change insurers within minutes in many instances.
The fact
that consumers have this degree of bargaining power to enter and
exit insurance transactions also undercuts the basic public policy
argument favoring recognition of tort liability that insurance, by its
245
nature, places the insured in a position of unequal bargaining.
The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from market competition,
independent of existing governmental regulation, is that insurers
must self-regulate their own conduct to survive. As briefly addressed
earlier with regard to comparisons of final settlement offers to
amounts ultimately recovered in bad-faith lawsuits, it is not in the

244. See, e.g., Geico Insurance, www.geico.com (last visited June 28, 2009)
(advertising that fifteen minutes can save fifteen percent or more on car insurance).
245. See, e.g., Arnold v. Nat’l County Mut. Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167
(Tex. 1987) (arguing that insurance contracts are unique because of inherently
unequal bargaining power between the insurer and insured, and thus bad-faith
actions should be maintained to prevent insurers from arbitrarily denying coverage
or forcing insureds to prematurely settle their claims); see also United Fire & Cas. Co.
v. Boulder Plaza Residential, L.L.C., No. 06-cv-00037-WYD-CBS, 2008 WL 2078114, at
*5 (D. Colo. May 13, 2008) (stating that courts construe ambiguous provisions
against the insurer and in favor of providing coverage because of the unique nature
of insurance); Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 456 P.2d 674, 681–82
(Cal. 1969) (finding that the quasi-public nature of insurance forces courts to look
beyond the rules of private contracts negotiated by parties of relatively equal
bargaining strength); Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Glass Serv. Co., 683 N.W.2d 792, 802
(Minn. 2004) (referring to insurance as “quasi-public” and that it should be within a
state’s police power to regulate); Wathor v. Mut. Assurance Adm’rs, Inc., 87 P.3d 559,
562 (Okla. 2004) (arguing that the quasi-public relationship creates a nondelegable
duty of good faith and fair dealing on the part of the insurer).
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financial self-interest of insurers to engage in bad faith.
The
benefits of intentionally delaying or denying a claim do not outweigh
the risk that even one of those cases will result in full contract
damages, extra-contractual damages, punitive damages, state
regulatory fines, attorneys’ fees, and future compliance costs.
Paradoxically, these incentives have not reduced bad-faith
247
litigation. Quite the contrary has occurred.
This increase in the
number and size of claims suggests that insurers are either brazenly
ignoring and flouting the law of bad faith, which is clearly against
their rational self-interest, or, more realistically, that the law is
inappropriately and increasingly punishing insurers for unintentional
acts, such as reasonable denials of claims, mistakes, or other minor
violations. The market of insurance already provides a sizeable
reward for those insurers who can best minimize mistakes, avoid badfaith lawsuits, and offer superior service. The penalty for an insurer’s
failure to do so is forcible exit from the market. The market system,
along with the additional level of protection provided by state
regulatory enforcement, can and should be relied upon to fairly
protect claimants. Litigation as a means to safeguard claimants
should become increasingly irrelevant.
B. Implications of Permitting Improper Bad-Faith Claims
Proponents of expanding private enforcement of bad-faith law
through greater statutory enumeration of alleged types of bad faith,
heightened penalties, or lower standards to maintain a claim,
routinely justify this advocacy on the grounds that any change in the
law will only impact “bad” insurers. A parallel situation would be that
increased health code standards only impact poorly managed
restaurants. The fallacy in this argument is that when expanding the
law to include less culpable offenses, the law will eventually implicate
every insurer’s actions, good or bad.
Premiums will rise.
Policyholders will suffer the costs.
When the law begins to punish insurer’s unintentional acts, the
foundations of the insurance system break down and the incentive
structures change. Quick settlements at higher, even unjustified
prices become encouraged so that insurers can avoid lawsuits.
Also, financial incentives and rewards for insurers that provide
superior services are diminished if the market effectively punishes
246. See supra Part II.B.4 (observing that the fears and costs of litigation often
force insurers to prematurely settle claims that may be invalid).
247. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (noting recent trends pointing to an
increase in bad-faith litigation).
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insurers when they are trying to be good. The insurance industry’s
best providers are inappropriately placed on equal or comparable
footing with insurers that would ordinarily be expelled from the
industry due to market forces.
Moreover, a lack of rational boundaries in bad-faith law harms all
consumers. Permitting extra-contractual damages awards in cases
that should not appropriately be settled does not serve a useful
purpose. It provides a windfall recovery to claimants based on events
such as human error or reasonable miscalculation, and appeals to the
biases that juries maintain against insurers. In the end, the insurance
consumer pays these superfluous costs. Insurers internalize the
systemic risks of bad-faith litigation and raise premiums accordingly.
Because this happens, in part, on an industry-wide level, the increase
in cost occurs independent of a specific insurer’s risks of bad-faith
litigation and does not distinguish the truly “bad” insurers from those
who are trying, admittedly without perfection, to be responsible.
Increases in insurance costs, in turn, contribute to a range of
societal problems. Presently in the United States, high insurance
premiums price large populations out of the market. Forty-five
million Americans, or one out of every seven persons, do not have
248
health insurance.
There are also millions of uninsured or
249
underinsured motorists driving in the streets; these persons are left
wholly unprotected in the event of an accident, and the costs of
coverage for insured motorists increase as a result. For example, in
Texas alone, there are an estimated three to four million uninsured
250
motorists out of the state’s sixteen million drivers.
As a policy
tradeoff, the benefits of placing rational limits on bad-faith lawsuits
and reducing system costs far outweigh the costs of additional
compensation to individual claimants for less culpable insurer acts.
This is because the state insurance department already imposes a
penalty on these acts, and because private claims may be addressed
through traditional contract theory.

248. Press Release, United States Census Bureau, Census Bureau Revises 2004 and
2005 Health Insurance Coverage Estimates (Mar. 23, 2007), available at http://
www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/health_care_insurance/
009789.html.
249. Cf. Road Hazard: Uninsured Driver Rates Climb, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 10,
2009, available at http://www.insuranceheadlines.com/Auto-Insurance/5595.html
(reporting an estimated increase of three million more uninsured drivers in the last
five years).
250. Terrence Stutz, 3 Years After Law, Texas Will Target Uninsured Drivers, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, May 8, 2008, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent
/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/050808dntexuninsured.dbf3df87.html.
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As proposed throughout this Article, the most efficient
enforcement system for insurance bad faith is to allow private lawsuits
where claimants can prove an intentional or reckless act on the part
of the insurer. In any other violation arising under a claims
settlement statute, the state’s insurance regulatory authority should
exercise exclusive jurisdiction. This clearer structure would prevent
dual-enforcement and double-punishment against insurers, while still
adequately safeguarding the interests of claimants and consumers at
large. It would also sustain the heavy market competition that
improves consumers’ bargaining power and necessitates selfregulation by insurers.
If bad-faith law continues on its present course, the implications
are adverse to all parties’ interests. Responsible and ethical insurers
will find it harder to differentiate from one another and compete,
claimants will be more susceptible to dishonest acts, and the system
costs will continue to increase, harming all consumers.
Also troubling, consumers may perceive an insurer’s inundation of
bad-faith claims and resulting high verdicts as an ordinary industry
practice. They may become apathetic to an insurer’s service
reputations, severely inhibiting the market system’s repudiation of
bad insurers, and they may differentiate insurers only with regard to
price. Worse, consumers might begin to tolerate bad faith as
inherent to the insurance business, perpetuating the flow of
improper litigation and exacerbating biases against insurers.
CONCLUSION
The law of bad faith has witnessed an extraordinary,
251
unprecedented development in the past three decades.
What
began as a court’s novel attempt to level the playing field in insurance
claims-handling is now enshrined in the common law or legislative
code of every state. The speed at which this law became so firmly
rooted, however, left important issues outstanding. Before the
common law evolved to address and refine this newly independent
and amorphous tort concept of bad faith, claims settlement statutes
were enacted across the country. The result was greater inconsistency
and uncertainty in the law, which was then magnified by courts’
widely varying statutory interpretations. The law that sought to
balance the insurance equation suddenly became unbalanced.

251. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 1 (noting that the development of bad-faith
law is noteworthy because courts have only recognized three or four new torts in the
past century).
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Caught on the unenviable side of the scale were insurers.
While the new laws operated to punish bad acts, plaintiffs’ attorneys
gradually recognized that less reprehensible acts, even reasonable
acts, were fair game in some jurisdictions. At the same time,
remedies were expanded, and continue to expand today as many
states reexamine their bad-faith statutes. The law thus shows little
evidence that bad-faith litigation has leveled off or reached maturity.
Rational boundary lines must be drawn, and the responsibility falls on
both state legislatures and state courts.

